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 This paper examines the initial phases of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq 
and evaluates the impact of Coalition policy and tactics on the population and the 
Iraqi insurgency.  The Coalition has faced unanticipated challenges and violence 
in Iraq for three primary reasons:  First, an inability to provide security for the 
Iraqi population, second, the rapid collapse in Iraqi confidence in the Coalition, 
and finally, the availability of uncontested physical and information space for 
opposition mobilization.  These three key developments occurred due to a 
mismatch between Coalition policies and tactics implemented in the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein.  At the macro level of analysis, Coalition 
policies and tactics are evaluated using criteria established by a first-hand 
authority on Arab revolt:  T.E. Lawrence, who fostered revolt in Mesopotamia in 
WWI.  At a more specific level of analysis, the author examines, through the lens 
of social movement theory, the creation and growth of opposition in Sunni areas, 
as well as the immediate threat posed by the Sadr II Movement.  This paper 
concludes that the rapid decline of popular support for the Coalition between 
April and August 2003 emanated from Coalition policies and tactics that did not 
emphasize security for the population.  In turn, these security policies created 
and enabled opportunities and space in which opposition to the Coalition could 
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The decision to effect regime change in Iraq was a historic turning point in 
U.S. military intervention.  This first attempt to implement the Bush Doctrine of 
preemption will have lasting impacts on grand strategy for both the nation and 
the tactics of the U.S. military.  Identifying the right lessons from this conflict is 
essential.  The United States-led Coalition in Iraq has sacrificed troops and 
treasure to displace Saddam Hussein with the intent to install a peaceful, 
democratic government.  Having won the military operations phase so 
convincingly, challenges in the post-conflict phase have unexpectedly placed 
enormous strain on the military and left victory in doubt.  This paper argues that 
the Coalition has faced unanticipated challenges and violence in Iraq for three 
primary reasons:  First, an inability to provide security for the Iraqi population, 
second, the rapid collapse in Iraqi confidence in the Coalition, and finally, the 
availability of uncontested physical and information space for opposition 
mobilization.  These three key developments occurred due to a mismatch 
between Coalition policies and tactics implemented in the immediate aftermath of 
the fall of Saddam Hussein 
The author uses two analytical approaches to examine post-conflict Iraq.  
The first is an examination of Coalition policies and tactics using criteria for 
fostering revolt from a first-hand authority on Arab rebellion, T.E. Lawrence.  
Using Lawrence’s framework, the author concludes: 
• Pre-conflict, U.S. military leaders planned on leveraging Iraqi 
military personnel in post-conflict Iraq, but the combined impact of 
the lack of resources to pay the Iraqi military and the Coalition 
decision to disband the Iraqi military left Coalition forces unable to 
satisfy Lawrence’s “doctrine of acreage.”   
• Coalition military commanders responded to increasing violence 
with aggressive offensive military operations, further limiting 
security for the Iraqi population.  
• A bifurcated chain of command for security created seams in 
Coalition security policy and tactics; these seams grew into 
xvi
unsecured areas of the country creating opportunities for opposition 
mobilization. 
• Post-conflict emphasis on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
mandated a significant percentage of intelligence resources focus 
solely on WMD; this placed operational and tactical commanders at 
a significant information disadvantage to the opposition until tactical 
intelligence capabilities were constituted.  
 
The second analytical framework uses social movement theory to analyze 
the growth of the opposition in Iraq.  Social movement theory examines how 
individuals and groups mobilize and sustain collective action against an existing 
power.  In the case of Iraq, the author examines the Sadr II Movement and the 
Sunni-based opposition and draws the following conclusions: 
• Uncontested physical and information space fueled the growth of 
the opposition within Iraq. 
• The Sadr II Movement’s emergence in Iraq was part of an 
organizational struggle within the Shi’a community; one that 
continues today. 
• Despite being weakened by his failed attempt to control key sites in 
Najaf in August 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr is the only named Iraqi 
opposition to the U.S.-led Coalition; given future political 
opportunity the Sadr II Movement remains a threat to a future Iraqi 
government. 
• The only unifying message for the Sunni-based opposition is anti-
Coalition.  The Sunni opposition has not presented a vision for a 
future, unoccupied Iraq.   
• The different motivations and message from the Sunni and Shi’a 
opposition act as a self-limiter in the overall effectiveness of the 
opposition. 
 
I conclude with implications and recommendations for US security 









I.  INTRODUCTION 
Washington would be responsible for providing the policy—and, I 
hoped, sufficient resources—to win the hearts and minds of the 
Iraqi people…The plan depended on two equal imperatives—
security and civil action.  Only if Iraq achieved both could Iraq be 
transformed into an example of the power of representative 
government. 
• GEN Tommy Franks1 
In January 2004, the well respected journalist James Fallows penned a 
scathing article attacking the Department of Defense (DoD) for ignoring pre-war 
planning that predicted potential pitfalls in the aftermath of conflict in Iraq.2   
Fallows’ article examines pre-war planning and its impact on post-conflict Iraq 
and asks critical questions about Coalition planning assumptions.  Central to his 
review are two critical questions:  First, did the U.S. deploy adequate troop 
strength for post-conflict operations, and second, did pre-war planning incorrectly 
assume a “liberation” effect resulting in unconditional support from the Iraqi 
population.  Fallows concludes that the anticipated liberation effect and 
inadequate troop strength have caused the challenges in post-conflict Iraq.  
Fallows highlights the challenges in Iraq through an analysis of U.S. leaders and 
their decisions; the next step in an effective analysis of post-conflict Iraq is to 
examine the impact of these decisions on the Iraqi population.  The U.S.-led 
Coalition faced unanticipated challenges in Iraq for three primary reasons:  First, 
an inability to provide security for the Iraqi population, second, the rapid collapse 
in Iraqi confidence in Coalition forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority, and 
finally, the availability of uncontested physical and information space for 
opposition mobilization.  These three key developments occurred due to a 
mismatch between Coalition policies and tactics implemented in the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein. 
                                            
1 Tommy Franks. 2004. American soldier. New York: Regan Books. 2004558617: 424. 
2 James Fallows. 2004. “Blind into Baghdad,”. The Atlantic Monthly 293, no. 1 (Jan/Feb): 52. 
2 
This paper will examine the initial phases of the occupation and take a 
broader view to evaluate Coalition strategy and the impact of Coalition policies 
and tactics on the population and the Iraqi insurgency.  For the purpose of this 
paper, strategy and its components are defined using a theory of strategy 
developed by Arthur J. Lykke.3  Lykke characterizes strategy in the form of an 
equation: 
Strategy equals Ends (objectives towards which one strives) plus 
Ways (courses of action) plus Means (instruments by which some 
end can be achieved).4   
In the case of Iraq, the analysis will center on Coalition policies and military 
tactics (Ways) and the availability of adequate resources (Means) to achieve the 
Coalition’s stated objectives (Ends)5.   
Coalition policies and tactics will be evaluated using criteria established by 
a first-hand authority on Arab revolt:  T.E. Lawrence.  In the aftermath of WWI, 
Lawrence established criteria for the creation of a revolt in Arab lands.  Central to 
his criteria is the role of the population.  The Iraqi population’s perception of the 
United States changed dramatically during the period April 2003 to March 2005.   
In the month immediately following Operation Iraqi Freedom, Americans were 
largely received as liberators, by May 2004 90% of the population viewed 
Americans as occupiers.6  Included in the analysis of the Iraqi population will be 
the expansion of Iraqi insurgent groups to determine if relationships exist 
between U.S. tactics and policies and the creation and growth of these groups.7  
The framework for this analysis is social movement theory.   
                                            
3 Arthur F Lykke Jr. 1997. “Defining Military Strategy.” Military Review, (January 1), 183-186. 
4 Ibid. 
5 For clarification, examples of Coalition policies are disbanding the Iraqi Armed Forces or 
de-Ba’athification.  Examples of military tactics in post-conflict Iraq include the use of offensive 
operations, such as raids and sweeps.   
6 Jim Lobe. 2004. “U.S.: Army Brass Restrained as Bush Pledges 'Freedom' for Iraqis.” 
Global Information Network (May 25) : 1. 
7 The author previously published articles on the growth of the Sunni-based insurgency and 





A. CHANGING IRAQI PERCEPTIONS 
Chapter II will use polling data to evaluate the perceptions of the Iraqi 
population in post-conflict Iraq.8  This analysis will center on four key areas: 
• Priorities of the Iraqi population 
• Confidence in Coalition Forces 
• Confidence in the Coalition Provisional Authority, and 
• Confidence in Iraqi institutions 
The changing views of the population provide the basis for evaluation of Coalition 
policies and tactics.   
 Analysis of polling data available from August 2003 – March 2005 
provides the following conclusions: 
• From the outset of polling in Iraq in August 2003, the highest priority for 
the Iraqi population has been regaining public security.   
• Over the life of the occupation, the Iraqi population has expressed little 
confidence in Coalition Forces.  Throughout August 2003 – March 
2005, a minimum of 48% of the population surveyed, said they “no 
confidence at all” in Coalition Forces. 
• The two peaks of Iraqi confidence in Coalition Forces occurred in 
February 2004 and January 2005 at just under 25% of the population 
expressing confidence in Coalition Forces.  The drop following the 
February 2004 peak likely occurred due to standoffs with opposition in 
Fallujah and Najaf in April 2004.  The January 2005 peak occurred 
coincident with Iraqi national elections. 
                                            
8 The polling data used is from two sources.  Polling data from Oxford Research International 
covers the period August 2003-June 2004.  These polls were conducted using the same 
methodology and questions for all three polls.  Polling data from the period October 2004 – March 
2005 comes from the Department of State’s Office of Research.   
4 
• The Iraqi population’s views and confidence with the Coalition 
Provisional Authority follow a very similar path as that of Coalition 
forces.   
• In contrast to the very steady vote of no confidence of the Coalition, 
the Iraqi population’s views toward the new Iraqi Army and Police 
improved steadily since polling began in August 2003.   
 
B. ANALYSIS OF COALITION POLICIES AND TACTICS 
Chapter III examines Coalition policies and tactics.  How the United States 
“lost” the Iraqi population during this phase will not be determined by examining 
Coalition policies, Coalition force tactics or insurgent tactics in isolation alone.  
The interaction between these three variables and the resulting unintended 
consequences must be analyzed.9  The purpose of this paper is not to assess 
blame, but rather to identify the impacts of U.S. tactics and policies for 
consideration in future conflicts.  My research will evaluate the change in Iraqi 
public perception over time in relation to U.S. Central Command tactics, Coalition 
Provisional Authority policy decisions, and coalition actions that influenced the 
population and the Iraqi insurgency.  The intent of the research is to separate 
popular generalizations from reality so that lessons can be learned.  As a basis 
for evaluating the likelihood of rebellion in an occupied Islamic nation, the author 
will use criteria established by T.E. Lawrence to evaluate the likelihood of 
rebellion in post-conflict Iraq.   
At the heart of this analysis is a detailed timeline of U.S. actions10.  These 
actions include key Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) policies, U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) tactics, U.S. reconstruction expenditures, and 
statements made by senior U.S. political and military leaders.  In addition to the 
                                            
9 Robert Jervis. 1997. System Effects : Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press., (DLC) 97001108. 
10 This timeline incorporates data from the following sources:  www.centcom.mil, 
www.iraqbodycount.net, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Brookings 
Iraq Index.  
5 
timeline development, the author incorporates interviews, as well as personal 
research and experience conducted during visits to Iraq in 2003 and 2004.   
The research and analysis of U.S. actions in the diplomatic arena will 
center on the decisions and policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority.  The 
analysis of CPA policies11 will focus on a series of critical issues, including 
establishment of CPA, looting, de-Ba’athification, disbanding the Iraqi Army, and 
election policies.  While much has been written of the results of these decisions, 
such as de-Ba’athification, additional work is needed to understand the 
implications of each of these decisions within the context of other U.S. actions.  
Additionally, evaluating when and how these critical CPA decisions were made 
and implemented adds to the understanding of the impact on other U.S. actions 
and the subsequent impacts on the Iraqi population.  CPA policies and directives 
are publicly available on the CPA website.12  Public statements by senior U.S. 
officials detail the rationalization for these decisions and first hand accounts by 
CPA officials that participated in the decision making process or implementation 
of these decisions are readily available.13    
Similarly, evaluation of the military actions in Iraq will begin with the 
research and analysis of USCENTCOM operational assumptions prior to 
executing Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The intent is to evaluate public statements, 
USCENTCOM press briefings, and senior leadership memoirs for U.S. planning 
assumptions in the areas of de-Ba’athification, use of the remnants of the Iraqi 
Army or police as a stabilization force, and anticipation of post-conflict violence.  
This review will center on the validity of the primary criticism of USCENTCOM; 
troop strength.  Analysis of post-conflict military actions will also examine                                             
11 The Coalition Provisional Authority was established on May 1, 2003 by the order of the 
President.  A predecessor organization, known as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Affairs was incorporated into the CPA.  The analysis of CPA will include ORHA decisions. 
12 Cpa-iraq.org 
13 James Fallows’ article is representative of many critiques of the CPA-led, post-war period.  
These analyses include:  Diamond, Larry. 2004. “What Went Wrong in Iraq;” Foreign Affairs 83, 
no. 5 (September/October): 34; Feldman, Noah. 2004. What we Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of 
Nation Building. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004016041; and Hoffman, Bruce. 
“Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” June 2004. Available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP127.pdf, [November 2004]. 
6 
relationships between Coalition tactics, intelligence capabilities, and security 
operations for the Iraqi populace.   
Particular emphasis of U.S. actions will center on the immediate aftermath 
of the war.  The period beginning with the fall of Baghdad (April 9, 2003) and 
ending with the bombing of the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf (August 2003).  This 
period set the objectives and tone of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s 
direction and established the basis for Coalition interaction with the Iraqi 
population.   
 
C. IMPACTS OF COALITION POLICIES AND TACTICS ON THE 
INSURGENCY 
Chapters IV and V examine the growth of opposition to the U.S.-led 
Coalition.  Following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, a number of groups 
mobilized support to counter the U.S.-led Coalition.  These groups countered the 
Coalition and the emerging Iraqi government through collective actions, both 
violent and non-violent.  Theories for analyzing contentious collective action have 
evolved, with inquiry varied by the unit of analysis.  Three primary analytical 
frameworks have emerged in the study of contentious collective actions.  
Structural theories, which focus on large unit analysis at the international or 
national level; rational choice theory, which attempts to explain individual actions 
and decisions; and an emerging field of study at the group level, known as social 
movement theory.  While social movement theory centers on the group level, a 
growing body of social movement research incorporates how groups mobilize 
individuals, in the form of recruitment and socialization, to engage in collective 
action.   
Social movement theory provides a balanced middle ground between 
structural and rational choice schools of thought and examines how individuals 
and groups mobilize and sustain collective action against an existing power.  The 
study of social movements has created a broad analytical framework to examine 
the emergence and development of social movements.  Using social movement 
7 
theory as the methodology for analysis, the author evaluates the Sunni-based 
insurgency and the Sadr II Movement using the four variables of: 
• Political Opportunity.  Political opportunity examines the interaction 
between an emerging movement and existing political structures, 
examples include:  regime change, abandonment of a nation by a 
foreign power, domestic policy shifts, or legal changes. 
• Mobilization Structures.  Mobilizing structures are the engine of a 
social movement, acting as the informal and formal vehicles, 
through which groups mobilize and engage in collective action.14   
• Frames and Framing Processes.  Frames and framing processes 
are simple but effective ways to define the movement and the 
problem being addressed in a way that is persuasive to a large 
audience. 
• Repertoires of Action.  The actions, both violent and non-violent, 
used by a movement in pursuit of common interests represent the 
repertoires.   
Evaluating the growth and actions of the opposition in the context of social 
movement theory enables the author to examine the import and impact of 
specific Coalition tactics and policies on the growth of the insurgency.  While 
Chapter III emphasized Coalition policies and tactics during the initial post-
conflict period, Chapters IV and V extend this evaluation to spring 2005.   
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with an analysis of lessons learned, 
implications for the current Iraqi conflict, and finally implications for future conflict.   
                                            
14 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. “Introduction:  Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Framing Processes-toward a Synthetic Comparative Perspective on Social 
Movements.”  In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:  Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and 
Mayer N. Zald, 1-20.  New York: Cambridge University Press, pg. 3. 
8 
The author argues that the Coalition has faced unanticipated challenges 
and violence in Iraq for three primary reasons:  First, an inability to provide 
security for the Iraqi population, second, the rapid collapse in Iraqi confidence in 
the Coalition, and finally, the availability of uncontested physical and information 
space for opposition mobilization.  These three key developments occurred due 
to a mismatch between Coalition policies and tactics implemented in the 
immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein.  This paper concludes that 
the rapid decline of popular support for the Coalition between April and August 
2003 emanated from Coalition policies and tactics that did not emphasize 
security for the population.  In turn, these security policies created and enabled 






















II.  CHANGING IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OVER TIME 
My belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.   
 Vice President Cheney, March 16, 200315 
 
The expectation that the Iraqi people would welcome Coalition forces as 
liberators was assumed by U.S. senior leaders.  The initial images of welcoming, 
liberated Iraqi citizens reinforced this notion.  Quickly the excitement of the 
Coalition’s dethroning of Saddam Hussein expired and the population’s view of 
liberating Coalition forces changed rapidly.  This chapter will examine the 
changing view of the Iraqi population toward Coalition forces, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, and Iraqi institutions, while also identifying the population’s 
priorities at different stages of the occupation.   
Perhaps most significant to the success of Coalition forces in post-conflict 
Iraq was the need for continued confidence of the Iraqi people.  The role and 
importance of popular support at the outset of the occupation cannot be 
overstated.  In their study of British “Small Wars Doctrine” executed in successful 
counterinsurgencies in Kenya, Cyprus, and Malaya, Bruce Hoffman and Jessica 
Yaw identified the significance of popular support: 
If the population is supportive, the government has greater leeway 
in using restrictive measures without fear of alienating the citizenry.  
The government can also reap great dividends from actively 
defending the population against insurgent reprisals in the form of 
increased civilian cooperation and the attendant provision of 
enhanced intelligence.16   
The opposition need receive only passive support from the population.  T.E. 
Lawrence in his analysis of the Arab revolt against the Turks in WWI identified 
the role of the population in fostering rebellion, “A friendly population, not actively 
                                            
15 Meet the Press with Tim Russert. Transcript for sept. 14, 2003 GUEST: Dick cheney, vice 
president 2004. Internet on-line. Available from http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/, [January 
2005]. 
16 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw. 1991. Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: The 
Development of Britain's "Small Wars" Doctrine During the 1950s. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
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friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the 
[occupier].”17  As such, opposition forces need only keep the population on the 
side lines, while Coalition forces need the population to take action to pinpoint 
the opposition.  Without the confidence of the population, the task for Coalition 
and emerging Iraqi forces became even more challenging.   
 
A. IRAQI POPULATION’S PRIORITES 
Without a doubt, one issue dominated the lives of Iraqis:  public security.  
In August 2003, Oxford Research International completed the first 
comprehensive, scientific poll of Iraq.  This poll serves as a baseline for 
establishing the priorities of the population.  The results of the first poll are shown 
below as Table 1.  Unequivocally, “regaining public security” was the dominant 
issue for the vast majority of Iraqis.   
August 2003:  Please tell me your priorities for the next 12 months? 
 First priority Second priority Third priority 
Regaining public security 67.3% 10.3% 10.3% 
Rebuild infrastructure 8.7% 32.4% 32.4% 
Following religious ideals 5.0% 6.1% 6.1% 
Iraqi self-governance 4.6% 9.1 9.1 
Reviving economy 4.1% 13.6% 13.6% 
Ensure that population can 
earn a decent living  
3.8% 15.0% 20.0% 
Table 1.   Iraqi population’s priorities – August 200318 
 
                                            
17 T. E. Lawrence. 1968. Evolution of a Revolt; Early Post-War Writings of T. E. Lawrence. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press: 119. 




Security remained the priority for the remainder of CPA’s reign.  Oxford 
Research completed three polls during the initial Coalition occupation.  In 
addition to the original August 2003 poll, two other polls were conducted in 
February 2004 and June 2004.  These polls provide a snapshot of the Iraqi 
population’s priorities during the CPA’s brief existence.  Table 2 below identifies 
the top two issues facing Iraqis during the August 2003 – June 2004 timeframe.   















Table 2.   Iraqi population’s priorities – August 2003 – June 200419 
 
Public security remained the highest priority throughout the Coalition 
Provisional Authority’s reign, which ended in June 2004.  In June 2004, the Iraqi 
Interim Government replaced the Coalition Provisional Authority as the governing 
body in Iraq.  Polling conducted in late 2004 and early 2005 by the Department of 
State, identified changing regional landscape in priorities.  While security 
remained the highest priority nationwide, areas of the country were ready to 
focus on other issues.  Table 3 below identifies priorities by region.  Areas, such 
as the Kurdish North and Tikrit/Baquba began to identify infrastructure is the 
                                            
19Oxford Research International, August 2003, “National Survey of Iraq.”  Available from:  
http://www.oxfordresearch.com/Iraq%20Autumn%202003%20Frequency%20Tables.PDF, [July 
2005], Oxford Research International, February 2004, “National Survey of Iraq.”  Available from:  
http://www.oxfordresearch.com/Iraq%20February%202004%20Frequency%20Tables.PDF, [July 
2005], and Oxford Research International, June 2004, National Survey of Iraq.  Available from:  
http://www.oxfordresearch.com/Iraq%20June%202004%20Frequency%20Tables.PDF , [July 
2005]. 
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most urgent issue.  This improved security picture perceived by some Iraqis 
shifted in the up tick of violence following the Iraqi national elections in January 
2005.  By March, security was again the highest priority in all regions except the 
Kurdish North.   
 
 In your opinion, what is the most urgent issue facing your country currently? (% BY 
REGION) 
 Baghdad Kurdish Kirkuk Tikrit- Baquba 
Mid-
Euphrates South 
 Dec Jan Mar Dec Jan MarDec Jan MarDec Jan MarDec Jan Mar Dec Jan Mar
Overall security of 
country 50 38 62 3 5 3 45 50 37 22 26 41 41 41 56 33 33 41
Infrastructure such as 
electricity, gas, 
energy and water 




11 6 8 23 20 24 18 10 15 16 8 18 12 16 16 20 15 24
Presence of 
Multinational Forces 6 6 2 -- -- 1 11 1 1 4 7 4 2 1 -- 1 2 1 
Housing crisis 4 4 3 4 3 11 2 -- 4 2 -- 4 2 1 2 2 1 2 
Federalism -- -- -- 33 22 13 -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Office of Research surveys  December 12-26, 2004; January 15-26 and March 15-22, 2005 
 
 
Table 3.   Iraqi population’s priorities by region – December 2004- March 
200520 
 
In summary, the Iraqi population’s priorities centered around one issue:  
security.  Table 4 summarizes the top two priorities of the Iraqi population from 
August 2003 to March 2005.   
                                            
20All responses that tallied lower than 9% throughout the period were removed by the author 
for clarity.  Department of State, Office of Research, Iraqis Sense Improved Security, Washington 

















Figure 1.   Summary of Iraqi Population’s Priorities – August 2003 – March 
2005 
 
In every poll but the month of the Iraqi elections (January 2005), security 
was the highest priority for the Iraqi population.  The Iraqi population’s concern 
over security greatly impacted its perception of Coalition forces.   
 
B. IRAQI POPULATION’S PERCEPTIONS OF COALITION FORCES 
The persistence of violence and the Iraqi population’s concern with public 
security are tightly linked to the Iraqi populace’s confidence in Coalition forces.  
As Figure 2 shows, by August 2003, over 78% of the population expressed either 
“not very much” or “no confidence” in Coalition forces.  This level of confidence 
remained constant throughout the period of shared U.S/British rule.21 
                                            
21 By United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, the U.S. and Great Britain were 
given the responsibilities of governing Iraq until such time as an Iraqi government could be 
installed.  This period ran from May 2003-June 2004, ending with the installation of the Iraqi 
Interim Government on 28 June 2004.   
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Figure 2.   Iraqi Confidence in Coalition Forces Aug 2003 – June 200422 
 
Following the transition to Iraqi Government rule, Iraqi’s lack of confidence 
in Coalition forces remained relatively constant.  Table 6 identifies by region the 
Iraqi population’s confidence in Coalition forces. Only January 2005 (the time of 
the Iraqi national elections) showed potential for improving confidence in 
Coalition forces.  By March 2005, the negative view of the population toward 
Coalition forces returned to pre-election levels. 
 
Table A-21.  How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the situation in Iraq? 
Coalition/Multinational forces (% BY REGION) 
 Baghdad Kurdish Kirkuk Tikrit / Baquba Mid-Euphrates South 
 Oct Dec Jan Mar Oct Dec Jan Mar Oct Dec Jan Mar Oct Dec Jan Mar Oct Dec Jan Mar Oct Dec Jan Mar
Great deal 8 2 13 5 45 42 33 41 8 11 8 25 2 -- 2 2 5 4 8 2 4 5 13 9 
Fair amount 5 6 11 8 27 40 36 29 6 8 14 10 2 4 8 4 7 6 7 8 4 6 15 11
Not very much 5 11 14 19 6 6 16 15 9 4 18 15 3 11 27 24 6 6 8 10 3 10 30 14
None at all 68 73 48 64 3 6 5 10 66 68 58 38 85 79 60 66 79 83 75 78 81 74 39 59
Don’t know 15 8 14 4 20 6 11 5 12 9 2 12 8 5 3 4 4 2 3 3 8 5 2 7 
Office of Research surveys October 15-25, December 12-26, 2004, January 15-26 and March 15-22, 2005 
  
Table 4.   Iraqi Confidence in Coalition Forces October 2004 – March 200523 
 
Over the life of the occupation, the Iraqi population has expressed little 
confidence in Coalition Forces.  Throughout August 2003 – March 2005, a 
                                            
22 Oxford Research International. 
23 Department of State, Office of Research, Iraqis Sense Improved Security, Washington 
D.C., April, 18, 2005: 10.  
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minimum of 48% of the population surveyed, said they “no confidence at all” in 
Coalition Forces.  Figure 3 shows the Iraqi’s perceptions of Coalition forces 
throughout the period under study.   






















Figure 3.   Iraqi Confidence in Coalition Forces – August 2003 – March 2005 
 
In summary, only on two occasions during the occupation did more than 
25% of the population express either a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence 
in the Coalition.  Figure 4 compares the number of Iraqis that expressed 
confidence24 in the Coalition vs. those Iraqis that had no confidence at all.   
                                            
24 The author has identified confidence as members of the population answering either a 
great deal or quite a lot of confidence in Coalition Forces.  
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Figure 4.   Comparison of Iraqi Confidence in Coalition Forces25 
 
The two peaks of Iraqi confidence in Coalition Forces occurred in 
February 2004 and January 2005 at just under 25% of the population expressing 
confidence in Coalition Forces.  The drop following the February 2004 peak likely 
occurred due to standoffs with opposition in Fallujah and Najaf in April 2004.  The 
January 2005 peak occurred coincident with Iraqi national elections.   
 
C. IRAQI POPULATION’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE COALITION 
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY 
The Iraqi population’s views and confidence with the Coalition Provisional 
Authority follow a very similar path as that of Coalition forces.   
                                            



















Figure 5.   Iraqi Confidence in the Coalition Provisional Authority Aug 2003 – 
June 200426 
 
The negative view of the Iraqi population toward all facets of the Coalition, 
both Coalition forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority did not extend to the 
Iraqi institutions re-established by the Coalition.   
 
D. IRAQI POPULATION’S PERCEPTIONS OF IRAQI SECURITY AND 
POLICE FORCES 
In contrast to the very steady vote of no confidence of the Coalition, the 
Iraqi population’s views toward the new Iraqi Army and Police improved steadily 
since polling began in August 2003.  Figure 6 shows the steady improvement in 
confidence in the reconstituted Iraqi Security Forces.  
                                            
26 Oxford Research International.   
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Figure 6.   Iraqi Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces Aug 2003 – March 200527 
 
Iraqi confidence in the new Iraq police followed a similar, positive path.  
Figure 7 identifies the growing confidence in the Iraqi police force.  






















Figure 7.   Iraqi Confidence in Iraqi Police Forces Aug 2003 – March 200528 
 
                                            
27 Oxford Research International and Department of State, Office of Research.  
28 Oxford Research International and Department of State, Office of Research.   
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Almost paradoxically, the Iraqi population increased its support of the Iraqi 
security organizations, even as violence increased during the same period.  
While confidence in Iraqi security forces grew, the confidence in their trainers, 
Coalition forces, continued to wane.   
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The populace has expressed little confidence in the Coalition since polling 
began in August 2003.  The peak of Iraqi confidence in the Coalition occurred in 
January 2005 when, for the only time during the occupation, “regaining public 
security” was not the #1 priority for the Iraqi populace.29  In hearings before 
Congress in March 2005, Andrew Krepinevich assessed the reasons for low 
popular support of Coalition efforts: 
Developing a secure environment in which reconstruction can take 
place takes time. The reason for this is that the population’s support 
is conditional on the government’s ability to demonstrate 
convincingly that it has both the means and the will to persevere. 
This critical factor has been lacking in the United States’ strategy 
for dealing with the insurgents. Despite professions that America 
will “stay the course” in Iraq, the population has, in fact, been 
subjected to a series of course changes by the US Government 
that provide a very weak foundation…30 
The roots of this distrust began in the initial stages of the occupation 
immediately following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.  The initial 
Coalition policies impacted not only the perceptions of the Iraqi populace toward 






                                            
29 Department of State, Office of Research, pg. 6. 
30 Andrew Krepinevich, “Are we winning in Iraq?,” testimony before the House Armed 
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III.  ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICIES AND TACTICS IN IRAQ 
A. ORHA 
History will credit or blame Ambassador Bremer for the United States’ 
performance in post-conflict Iraq, but the import of the ill-fated, short life of the 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) cannot be 
overstated.  Originally established as a transitional interim administration to 
bridge the gap between the ouster of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of 
an Iraqi government, ORHA faced enormous obstacles that proved 
insurmountable.  Due to its rapid disestablishment and absorption into CPA, little 
documentation exists on ORHA; yet it is clear the organization was plagued by a 
late start to planning, faulty assumptions, and a lack of resources.   
Unfortunately for the Coalition, these initial organizational challenges 
occurred at the most critical time for establishing trust and confidence with the 
Iraqi population.  ORHA existed from January 2003 to May 10, 2003 and was led 
by LTG (ret.) Jay Garner.  LTG (ret.) Garner was dealt a difficult hand.  ORHA’s 
hasty establishment and optimistic operational assumptions left Garner with a 
pickup team from disparate agencies, short on both experience and funding.  
Senior members of the Bush Administration believed that following an end to 
major ground operations in May 2003, Iraq would return to a complex yet stable, 
operating environment.  Vice President Dick Cheney noted on several occasions 
that the United States would be “greeted as liberators.”31  In his testimony to 
Congress in March 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
concurred, adding “Iraq [will be able to] finance its own reconstruction, and 
relatively soon.”32  As the ORHA soon discovered, however, these were false 
expectations. 
 
                                            
31 D. Milbank, & Wright, R. (2004). Off the Mark on Cost of War, Reception by Iraqis. 
Available online from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6338-




1. Political/Military Objectives - Operation Iraqi Freedom 
U.S. Central Command initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on March 
19, 2003 to achieve the following, Presidential-directed, objectives:33 
1. A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based 
government that renounces WMD development and use, and no longer 
supports terrorism or threatens its neighbors. 
2. Success in Iraq leveraged to convince or compel other countries to cease 
support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD. 
3. Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to 
a new, broad-based government. 
4. Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure. 
5. Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks. 
6. Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq. Gather intelligence on global terrorism; 
detain terrorists and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained 
under the Iraqi regime. 
 
To implement these political objectives, the US Central Commander, GEN 
Franks, established the following military objectives:34 
1. Defeat or compel capitulation of Iraqi forces. 
2. Neutralize regime leadership. 
3. Neutralize Iraqi TBM / WMD delivery systems. 
4. Control WMD infrastructure. 
5. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq. 
6. Deploy and posture CFC forces for post-hostility operations, initiating 
humanitarian assistance operations for the Iraqi people, within capabilities. 
7. Set military conditions for provisional/permanent government to assume 
power. 
8. Maintain international and regional support. 
9. Neutralize Iraqi regime’s C2 & security forces. 
10. Gain and maintain air, maritime and space supremacy. 
President Bush ordered GEN Franks to begin military operations on March 19, 
2003.   
 
                                            
33 Moseley, T. Michael. Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers. Shaw Air Force Base, 




34 Ibid, pg. 4. 
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2. Military Operations – March 20, 2003 – April 9, 2003 
The U.S. led Coalition began the sprint to Baghdad on March 19, 2003 
and ended April 9, 2003 with Coalition troops entering Baghdad.  Military 
operations continued throughout April and President Bush declared an end to 
combat hostilities on May 1, 2003.  The speed and efficiency of the victory over 
the Iraqi military surprised even U.S. forces.  Military historian John Keegan 
notes: “The war was not only successful but peremptorily short, lasting only 
twenty-one days, from 20 March to 9 April.  Campaigns so brief are rare, a 
lightning campaign so complete in its results almost unprecedented.”35  As of 9 
April, the only two military objectives yet unmet were:  posturing for post-hostility 
operations and setting the military conditions for provisional/permanent 
government to assume power.   
 
3. Military Humanitarian Assistance  
During the build-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, USCENTCOM military 
planners emphasized three main areas for immediate post-conflict action: 
1. Minimize the number of displaced persons 
2. Provide basic necessities (food, water, medicine) to the Iraqi people 
3. Preserve the oil fields as the future wealth of the Iraqi people36 
In each of these areas, the Coalition performed well.  Largely based on the 
tactics employed and the swift conclusion of the war, no refugee crisis ensued.  
Basic services were largely intact at pre-war levels and the Iraqi oil fields were 
seized undamaged by Coalition forces.  While the rapid conclusion of the war 
minimized the chances of a humanitarian crisis, the abridged conflict placed an 
additional strain on post-conflict security.   
                                            
35 Keegan, John, 2004. The Iraq War. New York: A.A. Knopf. (DLC) 13533757; pg. 1. 
36 Author’s notes, JTF-IV planning conference, MacDill AFB, FL, January 2003. 
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 Coalition military leaders were faced with difficult decisions.  As the 
security apparatus of the former regime disappeared, the Coalition was faced 
with a choice between eliminating the last remnants of the regime and providing 
security for Iraqi institutions and the population.  LTG William Wallace, 
Commander of U.S. Army 5th Corps in Baghdad, described the situation: 
Well, I don't think it was as much an issue of the number of troops 
as the fact that we were still fighting our ass off as we went into 
Baghdad. And our first responsibility was to defeat the enemy 
forces, both paramilitary and regular army. And as their resistance 
dissipated, as we were able to stabilize the military situation, then 
we were able to get around to point security and area security of 
the ministries and museums and places such as that.37 
Looters filled the breech between the disappearing Iraqi police force and the 
emergence of Coalition security; John Keegan describes the results: 
Looters appeared in thousands and began to pillage.  At first their 
targets were the office buildings of the regime in the government 
quarter of Baghdad.  Then the looters turned to nongovernmental 
facilities, including hospitals and schools…After a few chaotic 
weeks there was little left to steal, householders in the richer 
quarters were defending their properties and the American troops 
had established rough-and-ready order in the streets.38 
While the streets of Baghdad took several weeks to calm, other areas of the 
country did not have widespread looting.   
 Areas, such as Mosul and Basrah, were able to much more rapidly 
prepare for post-Saddam existence.  In fact, many important positive steps 
occurred in Iraq during the month after the fall of Baghdad.  In the north, Iraq’s 
second largest city, Mosul, held elections for a city council and a mayor, oil 
production reached 125,000 barrels a day, the first commercial airliner arrived in 
Iraq, and schools across Iraq opened.  The figure below identifies a number of 
key events in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 
                                            
37 Wallace, William.  Fifth Corps Commander Live Briefing from Baghdad, May 7, 2003, 
available from http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030507-0157.html, [April 2005]. 
38 Keegan, pg. 206. 
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May 1, 2003 May 2, 2003 May 3, 2003 May 4, 2003 May 5, 2003
Coalition Progress in Iraq - May 2003
May 2, 2003
First commercial airliner 
lands in Basra (Virgin Air)
May 3, 2003
Coalition announces oil 
production at 125,000 barrels/day
May 3, 2003
Schools re-open in Baghdad
May 2, 2003
Fire, police, and emergency workers in 
major Iraqi towns paid $20 to stay in place
May 5, 2003
Water supply is at or above pre-war 
levels in 14 of the 27 key cities. 
May 5, 2003
Power has been restored to residents 
and businesses at pre-war levels or 
higher in nine of 27 key cities. 
May 5, 2003
Coalition announces that order is being 
restored throughout the country with 19 
of 27 cities now considered permissive. 
May 1, 2003
Mosul elects city council and mayor
 
Figure 8.   Coalition Progress in Iraq early May 2003 
 
With the notable exception of security, many of the short term key 
indicators were moving in the right direction for the Coalition, the USCENTCOM 
organization tasked with leading post-conflict Iraq should have been poised for 
success.  Military humanitarian assistance was largely intended as a stopgap 
measure.  Under USCENTCOM the organization tasked with long term 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance was ORHA.   
 
4. Key Events during the ORHA Phase 
On January 20, 2003, President Bush signed National Security Policy 
Directive (NSPD) 24, establishing the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead 
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for post-conflict administration.39  As Secretary Rumsfeld’s choice to lead this 
effort, LTG Garner (ret.), brought experience in stability operations, having led 
forces in both Northern Iraq (after Desert Storm) as well as Bosnia.  He 
established three pillars for ORHA:  1. Humanitarian assistance; 2. 
Reconstruction, and 3. Civil administration.40  ORHA’s preparations were hasty 
and abridged.  ORHA’s first meeting that included all of the organization’s 
leadership occurred in late February 2003, just one month prior to CENTCOM’s 
execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Less than two months from the 
organization’s inception, ORHA deployed to Kuwait on March 16, 2003 to 
prepare to lead the post-conflict phase of operations.   
                                            
39 See Woodward, Bob, 2004. Plan of attack. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2004351204 for 
a description of the process and relationship between DoD and the Department of State leading 
up to the war.  Woodward describes a scenario different than most, that DoD and DoS agreed on 
DoD’s role as lead for post-conflict Iraq, but not on firing of key DoS employees involved in the 
Future of Iraq Project.  
40 George Packer. 2003. “War After the War Letter from Baghdad.” The New Yorker (Nov 
24): 059. 
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Jan 2003 Feb 2003 Mar 2003 Apr 2003 May 2003
ORHA - Key Events
Jan - May 2003
May 1, 2003
Pres. Bush declares end to major hostilities
May 6, 2003
Amb. Bremer named Iraqi Administrator
Jan 20, 2003
President signs NSPD 24 establishing ORHA.
Feb 21, 2003
ORHA "rock drill" to organize and prioritize tasks.
Mar 16, 2003
ORHA deploys to Kuwait.
Mar 23, 2003




Al-Khu'i murdered in Najaf
Apr 21, 2003
LTG Garner (ret.) arrives in Iraq.
 
Figure 9.   ORHA Key Events41 
 
By the time, Garner and his staff arrived in Baghdad on 21 April 2003, 
Baghdad had fallen and the humanitarian crisis that ORHA prepared for never 
materialized.  In a special report analyzing post-conflict reconstruction, the United 
States Institute for Peace (USIP) said: “The most remarkable aspect of pre-
occupation economic planning was its focus on a single contingency:  
humanitarian disaster.”42  Even before ORHA arrived, the dye had been cast 
against the organization.  The preconditions placed on the organization, in the 
form of the presumed operating environment, were quickly dispelled as looting 
ravaged the country and shattered any perception of Coalition control.  Two other 
                                            
41 Compiled from USCENTCOM News Generator reports available from www.centcom.mil  
42 Anne Ellen Henderson, April 2005, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with 
Economic Reconstruction in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace.   
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key events occurred even before ORHA’s arrival:  1. The rapid mobilization of 
supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr43 and 2. The death of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i (son 
of revered Najaf scholar Grand Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i).44  Al-Khu’i, who 
had been protected by US forces on his return to Iraq, was intended to be a 
Coalition friendly voice within the majority Shi’a community.  The loss of this likely 
strategic ally combined with the emergence of the firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr 
rocked the ORHA boat and exposed two other challenges to the pre-conflict 
ORHA planning:  lack of resources and security. 
Pre-conflict, ORHA identified an abundance of short-term funding 
requirements.  This funding was intended to fund initial reconstruction 
requirements, pay Iraqi government workers, and retain portions of the Iraqi 
military.45  The bulk of this funding was expected via a large supplemental 
request from DoD to Congress to fund US military and stabilization operations in 
Afghanistan, as well as Iraq.  The problem for Garner was that the supplemental 
was not approved until September 2003, long after the dissolution of ORHA.  The 
initial funding provided to ORHA had very little discretionary spending with the 
vast majority of funds given to USAID for reconstruction contracts issued in 
Washington.46  Insufficient funding prompted Garner, following a tour of a 
damaged electrical plant, to make the following statement:  “What would be really 
great, a great tribute to the Iraqi people is for General Electric to come over here 
                                            
43 See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the growth of the Sadr II Movement. 
44 Linda Robinson. 2004. Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces. New 
York: Public Affairs. 2004053531. 
45 The unnamed senior defense official was likely LTG Jay Garner (ret.).  At a number of 
occasions throughout the briefing, the official describes himself in the first person as reporting 
directly to the CENTCOM Commander.   
46 According to the initial OMB update to Congress, through early June 2003, ORHA and 
subsequently CPA had $605M of DoD resources.  Of this amount $333M was dedicated to 
paying former Iraqi government employees and the remainder used for ORHA and ministries 
standup.  The detailed funds breakout is available at: Office of Management and Budget. Report to 
congress: Pursuant to section 1506 of the emergency wartime supplemental appropriations act, 2003 (public 
law 108-11) (june 2, 2003). 2003. Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/Emergency_Wartime_Supp_Daniels_Ltr.pdf>. [August 30, 
2004], pg. 15. 
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and donate some new parts and things that help us get this straight.”47  This plea 
for help from an American company portends resource challenges in much larger 
scope, particularly for security and governance.   
 
a. Security and Troop Strength 
Decisions made in advance of Operation Iraqi Freedom, greatly 
impacted ORHA.  Potentially, the most costly involved the planning for security.  
Did DoD, USCENTCOM, and ORHA ignore history’s lessons?  Following his 
experiences fostering rebellion in Mesopotamia during the Arab Campaign of 
1916-1918, T. E. Lawrence identified the ingredients for creating a revolt against 
a foreign, occupying army.  Central to his thesis is not the size of the opposition 
force, but rather the intensity and freedom of movement of the insurgents, 
combined with the size and capacity of the foreign army.  A key criticism of 
Coalition decisions in Iraq has been the size of both the invasion force and the 
subsequent occupation armies.48   
Lawrence described the characteristics of a vulnerable occupation 
force as follows: 
(The rebellion) must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form 
of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of 
acreage:  too few to adjust a number to space, in order to dominate 
the whole area effectively from fortified posts.49 
Was the U.S.-led occupation force too small for post-conflict Iraq?  
It is clear that neither Garner, nor GEN Franks intended to use solely Coalition 
troops to provide security.  A potential source of manpower was the former Iraqi 
Army.  This option was detailed in March 2003 during a briefing conducted by an 
unnamed U.S. senior defense official outlining plans for the Office of 
                                            
47 CENTCOM News Release, April 23, 3003, April Pool Report of Mr. Garner's Trip to 
Baghdad (Part 3 of 3), available online from: . 
http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/News_Release.asp?NewsRelease=200304167.txt, 
[August 2005]. 
48 See Appendix 2 for an analysis of the growth of the Sunni-based insurgency. 
49 Lawrence, T. E. 1968. Evolution of a revolt; early post-war writings of T. E. Lawrence. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, pg. 119. 
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Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).50  The official described 
plans for the Iraqi Army as follows: 
So one of our goals is to take a good portion of the Iraqi regular 
army -- I'm not talking about the Republican Guards, the special 
Republican Guards, but I'm talking about the regular army -- and 
the regular army has the skill sets to match the work that needs to 
be done in construction. So our thought is to take them and they 
can help rebuild their own country. We'd continue to pay them. And 
these committees will nominate work for them to do, do things like 
engineering, road construction, work on bridges, remove rubble, 
de-mine, pick up unexploded ordnance, construction work, et 
cetera, et cetera.  That also allows us -- and using army allows us 
not to demobilize it immediately and put a lot of unemployed people 
on the street. So it works a pretty good process. They're working to 
rebuild their country. It's reestablishing some of the prestige that the 
regular army has lost over the years, and it allows us to get a lot of 
good things done for the country.51  
This plan didn’t directly call for use of the military as part of security 
forces, but kept portions of it available for service, something that didn’t occur in 
post-conflict Iraq.  In his memoir, GEN Franks also anticipated the use of portions 
of the Iraqi military.  On the day conflict began in Iraq, GEN Franks forwarded a 
query to the Pentagon inquiring about resources to pay the Iraqi Army post-
conflict.52  This request went unanswered. 
The intended policy of rehabilitation of the Iraqi Army was never 
fully implemented.  This policy was hindered by a series of obstacles:  1. The 
self-resignation and disappearance of large portions of the remnants of the Iraqi 
Army53; 2. Lack of a cohesive plan as to how to leverage the former Army; and 3. 
Lack of resources to pay the Iraqi Army.  Some units, such as the 101st Airborne 
Division, were moderately successful in re-recruiting Iraqi Army personnel to 
                                            
50 The unnamed senior defense official was likely LTG Jay Garner (ret.).  At a number of 
occasions throughout the briefing, the official describes himself in the first person as reporting 
directly to the CENTCOM Commander.   
51 Department of Defense, 2003, Backgrounder on Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance in Post-Conflict Iraq, March 11, 2003, retrieved from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03122003_t0311bgd.html, [April 2005].   
52 Tommy Franks. 2004. American Soldier. New York: Regan Books. 2004558617; pg. **. 
53 Keegan, pg. 4. 
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serve in post-conflict Iraq, but this policy was not uniform and doomed from the 
outset due to the lack of resources.  ORHA’s original plan to recoup portions of 
the Iraqi Army was tied to having resources to pay them.  Maj Gen Patreaus, 
Commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) described the importance 
of resources during this initial phase of conflict, “Money is ammunition in this war 
right now, we didn’t have any for a long time.”54  The 101st was tasked with 
Northern areas in post-conflict Iraq.   
Would the Iraqi Army have returned to service if called and paid?  
Likely, yes.  When asked, the Iraqi police forces returned to their jobs en masse.  
Per CENTCOM reports, over 90% of Baghdad’s police force had returned to their 
posts by May 17, 2003.  Army personnel would also likely have returned.   
Before and after the decision to disband the Iraqi Army, ORHA and 
later CPA faced increasing concern about security within the Coalition.  The 
figure below identifies increasing violence that caused alarm both to military and 
civilian leaders. 
                                            
54 Thomas Day.  August 7, 2003, “Alabama Senator pays visit to 101st,” Iraqi Destiny, Vol. 1, 
Issue 34, pg. 5. 
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Apr 10, 2003 Apr 25, 2003 May 1, 2003 May 5, 2003
Violence during the ORHA Period
Apr 29, 2003
16 Iraqis killed, 75 wounded by U.S. 
troops after protest in Fallujah turns violent
May 1, 2003
7 U.S. soldiers wounded in Fallujah
May 3, 2003
Several Iraqis fired rifles at a U.S. 82nd 
Airborne Division convoy near Al Fallujah 
May 3. Soldiers on the convoy returned fire 
and proceeded on their route. May 4, 2003
BAGHDAD, Iraq - A 3rd Infantry Division soldier 
was shot in the head by an Iraqi civilian at an 
intersection on May 4.
May 5, 2003
Off-duty Iraqi policemen fired 
on U.S. Marines in Al-Hillah 
May 8, 2003
U.S. soldier killed by sniper in Baghdad
May 9, 2003
A grenade exploded in an Al Kut movie 
theater May 8, wounding five civilians.
May 9, 2003
Looters attempted to steal ammunition from a 
cache in Baghdad late Friday afternoon. Soldiers 
from the Third Infantry Division fired on the 
looters after they demonstrated hostile intent. 
Apr 10, 2003
Al-Khu'i murdered in Najaf
 
Figure 10.   Acts of violence April – May 2003 
 
As noted by the figure above, violence persisted during the ORHA phase, but at 
very low levels.  Even this small amount of violence was in sharp contrast to pre-
conflict assumptions of a stable, secure Iraq, causing concern within the 
Coalition.  As violence persisted, another area of pre-conflict planning showed 
cracks:  civil administration and governance.  
 
5.  Governance 
ORHA intended on a rapid transition to Iraqi self-rule.  Garner described 
the next steps toward an Iraqi democracy upon his arrival in Baghdad: 
The new ruler of Iraq is going to be an Iraqi. I don't rule anything. 
I'm the coalition facilitator to establish a different environment 
where these people can pull things together themselves and begin 
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self-government process. And with our assistance begin a 
reconstruction process, and end up with a democracy that 
represents the freely elected will of the Iraqi people.  I think [that is 
in line with what the Iraqi people want], thus far they've responded. 
But we're flexible.... This is a work in progress.55 
Following Garner’s first meetings with Iraqi religious, tribal, and expatriate 
leaders, it quickly became apparent that Iraq was not ready for self-rule and that 
a longer than expected occupation was about to begin.   
 
6. Reconstruction During the ORHA Phase 
While the military was providing immediate assistance and essential 
services restoration, ORHA was responsible for initiating the long-term 
reconstruction that would enable Iraq to emerge from a decade of sanctions and 
30 years of totalitarian rule.  The economic challenges facing the Coalition were 
complex: 
• Restoring government economic functions after looting and state 
collapse; 
• Preventing currency collapse, hyperinflation, and economic chaos; 
• Rebuilding infrastructure ravaged by war, sanctions, looting, and 
neglect; 
• Rehabilitating a health care system that had not advanced in two 
decades; 
• Dismantling corrupt, dysfunctional state economic controls; 
• Stimulating private sector growth stunted by government 
interference.56 
 
Much of the long-term reconstruction activities during the ORHA phase fell to the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  In advance of conflict, 
USAID competed and awarded a number of contracts in an attempt to jump start 
                                            
55 CENTCOM News Release, April 23, 2003, April Pool Report of Mr. Garner's Trip To 
Baghdad (Part 3 Of 3). 
56 Henderson, Anne Ellen, April 2005, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with 
Economic Reconstruction in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace, pg. 3. 
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reconstruction.  The figure below identifies the U.S. contractor selected, the 
contract amount, and emphasis area of the contract. 57 
Mar 2003 Apr 2003 May 2003 Jun 2003 Jul 2003
USAID Reconstruction Contracts 
March - July 2003
April 17 - Bechtel awarded $688M 
contract to rebuild schools, 
hospitals, and other major capital 
projects.
May 5 - Skylink awarded $31M 
contract for airport administration
April 11 - Research Triangle Institute 
awarded $167M contract for local governance
April 11 - Creative Associates awarded $62M 
contract for primary and secondary education 
April 30 - Abt Associates awarded $43M contract 
to strengthen the entire Iraq health system
July 25 - Bearing Point awarded $240M 
contract for economic governance
March 24 - Stevedoring Services of America 
awarded $15M contract for Seaport administration
 
Figure 11.   USAID Reconstruction Contracts, March – July 200358 
 
These contracts were a planned step on rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq.  The 
emerging gap in ORHA reconstruction activities was the availability of job-
producing projects.  In establishing Civilian Conservation Corps projects in the 
1930s, Franklin Delano Roosevelt said, “We can take a vast army of these 
                                            
57 As reconstruction continued, the number of organizations involved in issuing contracts 
increased dramatically.  See the article Harris, Shane, July 2004, “Outsourcing Iraq,” Government 
Executive, July 1, 2004, pg. 56-63 for an excellent recap of the complexity and scope of 
reconstruction.   
58 CPA Inspector General, 2005, Updated Contracts, retrieved from http://www.cpa-
ig.com/pdf/table_j_1_verified_contracts_updated.pdf, [April 2005].. 
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unemployed out into healthful surroundings.  We can eliminate, to some extent at 
least.... the threat that enforced idleness brings to spiritual and moral stability.”59  
Idleness was common in pre-conflict Iraq.  Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq 
was essentially a welfare state with large portions of the population relying on the 
state for food rations, benzene, and salaries.  This ended with the Coalition 
invasion.  The state ceased to exist and with the end of the state, salaries, food, 
and benzene rations ended as well. 
 
7. ORHA Phase – Impacts on the Population 
During ORHA’s short life span, no polling was conducted to assess the 
views of the population toward the Coalition.60  Anecdotal reporting suggests that 
as Coalition forces entered areas previously oppressed by Saddam Hussein, 
Coalition forces were greeted as liberators or at worst the population was 
indifferent to the arrival of Coalition forces.61  That sentiment appears to have 
been short-lived.  ORHA faced an incredibly difficult assignment.  This 
assignment was made near impossible by the lack of resources to immediately 
infuse into the reconstruction and security efforts.  Following Congressional staff 
visits to Iraq in June, staffers reported to the Senate Foreign Relations committee 
problems ORHA faced: 
The United States is dealing with a huge expectations gap in Iraq. 
Following our rapid military success, Iraqis expected that the United 
States could dramatically improve almost overnight living conditions 
that had declined precipitously for more than a decade.62 
                                            
59 Frankling D. Roosevelt. “Civilian Conservation Corps Dedication Ceremony”, Solvang 
Mission, Solvang, California, 1933..  
60 The first formal poll to be conducted was done by the Iraq Center for Research and 
Strategic Studies in June 2003.  The site http://www.iraqanalysis.org maintains links to all publicly 
available polls. 
61 Keegan, pg. 5. 
62 Richard Lugar, July 2003, Iraq: Meeting the Challenge, Sharing The Burden, Staying The 
Course, A Trip Report to the Members of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, available from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2003/0730iraqreport.pdf, pg. 2, [April 
2005].. 
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These unrealistically high Iraqi expectations combined with ORHA’s lack of 
resources combined for increasing pressures on the Iraqi population.  The 
original assumption that Iraq could fund its own reconstruction may have been 
true, but how quickly?  ORHA’s gap in resources could not have come at a worse 
time.  In many ways, ORHA and its unmet expectations set the conditions that 
Coalition forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority will deal with for the 
remainder of the occupation.   
 
B. CPA PHASE I 
ORHA pre-planning anticipated a secure operating environment, a rapid 
transition to Iraqi self-rule, and a reconstruction largely funded by Iraqi oil.  When 
these expectations proved false, the Coalition radically changed course and 
established an occupying “authority.”  The transition from Garner and his 
“facilitator” role to a unilateral authority led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer was 
stark and immediate.  The first phase63 of CPA’s rule of Iraq is characterized by a 
series of critical decisions that will shape the future of Iraq.  Any critique of the 
CPA and these initial decisions should include the caveat that the organization 
was created one month into the occupation.  This late start plagued the 
organization throughout its short history. 
1. CPA Challenges 
The mission given to Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority was 
unprecedented in U.S. history and varied greatly from previous occupations in 
Germany and Japan.  Take a diverse population ruled for 30 years by a 
totalitarian ruler and transform the government to a democracy and the economy 
to a free market.  Complete this mission in under a year while implementing 
freedom of religion, ensuring harmony among varied ethnic groups, and 
recreating an Army and police force.  Iraq is a nation roughly the size of 
California with a population of approximately 24 million.  The nation is divided by 
religion and ethnicity (60% Shi’a , 20% Sunni Arab, and 20% Sunni Kurd and 
                                            
63 The designation of Phase I is the author’s.  This period was critical in determining the 
future of Coalition efforts in Iraq.  It begins with Bremer’s designation as the CPA Administrator 
(May 6, 2003) and extends to the Najaf mosque bombing in August 2003.   
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now, various political parties.64  In 1980, Iraq was an economic power, operating 
as a creditor for the region.  Under Saddam’s rule, Iraq became an international 
pariah and was punished by a decade and a half of international sanctions.  At 
the outset of OIF, Iraq was in debt over $120 billion.65  The CPA’s task, absent 
any violence, was certainly complex.   
The environment faced by CPA was unique.  Never before had an 
element of the U.S. government faced such a highly dynamic, complex 
environment as an occupying force.  Parallels have been drawn to the Marshall 
Plan and the occupation of Japan, but the CPA situation differed in three major 
aspects:  lack of sustained international participation, arbitrary timelines placed 
on CPA to transition the government to Iraqi leaders, and strength of the violent 
opposition.66  Many dissimilar, external elements influenced and pressured CPA.  
During the initial phases of CPA, the organization understood the highly complex 
tasks in governing and rebuilding the nation, but expected that the environment 
for reconstruction contractors would ultimately be safe and stable.67  Under these 
planning assumptions, Bremer was assigned to lead an organization comprised 
of subject matter experts assigned to the CPA by their respective parent 
organizations.  These initial planning assumptions were key to the initial direction 
of the organization.   
 
2. CPA Initial Decisions 
Unequivocally, Bremer changed the tenor and approach of the Coalition’s 
occupation.  Upon his arrival Bremer issued a number of orders that impacted all 
areas of Iraqi governance, security, and the economy.  The two most significant 
                                            
64 Dept of State. (2004). Background note:  Iraq. Available online from; 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm, [August 2004].. 
65 M. Vesely. (2004). “Trading Iraq's pre-war debts.” Middle East, (347), 48. 
66 These conclusions were drawn from a previous group project completed by the author, 
Chad Jones, and Jaime Gomez. 
67 DoD Inspector General. (2004). Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority 
by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington (D-2004-057). Availble online from: 
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/fy04/04-057.pdf, pg. 24, [August 2004]. 
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decisions occurred in mid-May:  de-Ba’athification and disbanding of the Iraqi 
Army.  Much has already been written on the impacts of de-Ba’athification on 
governance and reconstruction. Rather than rehash these analyses, I will revisit 
the de-Ba’athification decision in context of CPA relations with the majority Shi’a 
population.  Likewise, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army will be examined in a 
review of the security situation during this time period68.  Other critical decisions 
impacted the governance of Iraq.  The first was the decision to appoint a limited 
Iraqi advisory body, known as the Iraqi Governing Council, as a first step toward 
Iraqi self-rule.  The second and perhaps equally important governance decision 
stopped local elections; thereby abandoning the initial approach implemented by 
regional Coalition military commanders and instead substituted appointments 
over elections.69   
 
3. CPA Objectives 
Within a month of its establishment, the CPA had identified four 
overarching objectives that served as the basis for its strategy in Iraq.  According 
to the first of several quarterly OMB reports mandated by Congress, the CPA 
sought to establish a secure environment for the Iraqi people and for the conduct 
of relief and recovery activities; to achieve measurable improvement in the lives 
of the Iraqi people; to maximize contributions from other countries and 
organizations; and to support Iraqis as they prepared for democratic self-
government.70  Figure 1 summarizes the “four pillars” of CPA’s objectives. 
                                            
68 See Fallows for a discussion of troop strength decisions leading up to the conflict.   
69 Diamond, pg. 34.. Both Diamond and Feldman provide insight into the governance 
decisions in Iraq.  Also see Sistani’s website at http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/ir5.htm for 
the English version of Sistani’s June 2003 statement demanding direct elections.  This simple one 
paragraph statement is very close to the eventual compromise election plan negotiated by the 
United Nations. 
70 Office of Management and Budget. (2003). Report to congress: Pursuant to section 1506 
of the emergency wartime supplemental appropriations act, 2003 (public law 108-11) (June 2, 
2003). Availalbe online from 





Figure 12.   CPA objectives (June 2003) 
 
To achieve these aggressive objectives, CPA required trained, proficient 
professionals ready to land in Iraq and make immediate progress.  The 
organization was largely a pickup team with an organizational structure drawn in 
haste to redirect Coalition efforts in Iraq. 
 
4. CPA Organizational Structure 
On May 22, 2003, UN Security Council Resolution 1483 recognized the 
role of the United States and Great Britain as the occupying authorities 
responsible for the interim governance of Iraq.71  Bremer codified the Coalition 
Provisional Authority as the entity responsible for discharging these duties with 
promulgation of CPA Regulation #1.72   
To populate the CPA, U.S. government agencies were tasked to provide 
experts in highly specialized, complex areas, such as, governance, international 
law, electrical engineers, etc.  These highly complex tasks combined with a one-
year timeline required highly trained professionals.  While envisioned on paper, 
the professional bureaucracy did not completely mature due to the hostility.  All 
military billets in the organization were filled, but military expertise focused on 
                                            
71 UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, available from 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement, 
[May2005]. 
72 L.P. Bremer. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1. 2003. Internet on-line. 
Available from <http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1 
The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf>. [August 2004]. 
– Establish a secure environment for Iraqi 
people and conduct of relief and recovery 
– Achieve measurable improvement in the 
lives of the Iraqi people
– Maximize contributions from other countries 
and organizations









rapid re-establishment of essential services, not the long-term reconstruction 
tasked to CPA.  Civilian positions expected to handle specialized tasks, such as 
constitutional and international law, foreign debt negotiations, judicial reform, and 
creating Iraqi governmental institutions, were gapped with only one third of all 
civilian positions filled due to lack of volunteers.73  CPA’s personnel challenges 
were significant, but the most challenging organizational issue facing CPA was 
the command relationship between CPA and Coalition Forces.   
 
a. Split Chain of Command 
 One of the most critical organizational hurdles facing the Coalition 
in Iraq was the creation of two separate chains of command for security.  In his 
founding regulation, Bremer identified CPA’s authorities: 
The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order 
to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period 
of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and 
stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely 
determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts 
to restore and establish national and local institutions for 
representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and 
sustainable reconstruction and development.74 
This order clearly identified CPA as the organization responsible for “restoring 
conditions of security and stability,” yet in the next paragraph Bremer 
acknowledges that the ability to carry out security is under the purview of U.S. 
Central Command:   
As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of U.S. 
Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring 
hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; 
searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass 
                                            
73 United States General Accounting Office. (2004). Rebuilding Iraq (GAO-04-902R). 
Availalble online from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04902r.pdf, pg. 37, [August 2004]. 
74 Bremer, L. P., Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1. 2003. Internet on-line. 
Available from <http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1 
The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf>. [August  2004].  
41 
destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy 
generally.75 
Both organizations responded to the Secretary of Defense, but military 
commanders in Iraq reported to U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida, while 
Bremer reported directly to the Pentagon.  The organization chart below shows 
the split chain of command. 
 
Figure 13.   CPA and USCENTCOM Command Relationships76 
 
This relationship eventually evolved to a near-term, long-term split 
of responsibilities with Coalition forces responsible for near term security and 
CPA responsible for investing in the long term recreation of Iraqi security forces.  
From the outset, security fell squarely on the shoulders of Coalition military 
forces.  Bremer’s decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army placed an even larger 
burden on Coalition forces.  The challenge facing Coalition forces was 
                                            
75 Bremer. 
76 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 29, 2003, Iraq: Status and 
Prospects for Reconstruction-Resources, Washington D.C., pg. 86. 
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maintaining T.E. Lawrence’s “doctrine of acreage.”  An alarming trend emerged 
during the May – July 2003 timeframe.  This threat was the increase of low level 
attacks on Coalition forces.  These early attacks were uncoordinated sniper, 
grenade, and RPG attacks on patrols moving through Iraq.  Figures 7 and 8 
show the increase in attacks, as well as the resulting casualties. 








Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03
# of Attacks
 
Figure 14.   Attacks on the Coalition – June – September 200377 
 
                                            
77 O'Hanlon, M., A. L. de Albuquerque. Iraq Index: Tracking Variables Of Reconstruction & 
Security In Post-Saddam Iraq . Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>. [Dec 2004], pg. 18.  Brookings has compiled 
these numbers based on Coalition reports.  The June 2003 numbers are incomplete.  Based on 
compilation method, the above numbers are not exact, but represent the trend experienced in 
Iraq.  
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Figure 15.   Coalition Killed/Wounded from Opposition Attacks78 
As attacks increased, Coalition forces began to again conduct 
combat operations (see Figure 9 below) focused on rooting out the violent 
opposition and former regime elements.  These operations further diluted troops 
available to provide security and assurance for the Iraqi population.   
                                            
78 M. O'Hanlon., A. L. de Albuquerque. Iraq Index: Tracking Variables Of Reconstruction & 
Security In Post-Saddam Iraq . Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>. [Dec 2004].  The killed in action numbers are 
a combination of Brookings’ numbers.  They include U.S. deaths from hostile action, UK deaths, 
and other Coalition military deaths during the time period.  Wounded in action numbers are only 
available for US forces.   
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Jun 2003 Jul 2003 Aug 2003
Significant Military Operations Conducted 
during CPA Phase I
Jun 12, 2003
Operation Peninsula Strike - June 12 - June 
14 resulted in the capture of approximately 
400 detainees and the seizure of numerous 
weapon systems and ammunition.  All but 30 
detainees have been released by June 15.
Jul 22, 2003
July 22: U.S. Special Forces kill Uday and 
Qusay Hussein in a firefight in Mosul.
Jun 15, 2003
Operation Desert Scorpion - June 15 to June 29, 
Coalition forces conducted raids resulting in 
1,330 individuals being detained, hundreds of 
weapons confiscated, and $9,463,000 in U.S. 
dollars, 1,557,000,000 in Iraqi Dinars, 1,071 bars 
of gold and 52 vehicles captured.
Jun 29, 2003
Operation Sidewinder - June 29 - July 5, 
Coalition forces conducted raids in the Tikrit area. 
282 individuals were detained and a variety of 
weapons were seized. In addition, $5000.00 U.S. 
cash and approximately 11 million Iraqi Dinar, or 
about $6000.00 U.S. dollars, were seized.
Jul 12, 2003
Operation Soda Mountain - July 12 - July 17, 
Coalition forces conducted 141 raids resulting in 
611 individuals detained, including 62 former regime 
leaders. 
Aug 12, 2003
Operation Ivy Lightning - August 12, Coalition 
forces launched a surgical strike in the remote 
towns of Ain Lalin and Quara Tapa, located along 
the Jabal Hamrin Ridge, to isolate and capture 
non-compliant forces and former regime loyalists.
Figure 16.   Significant Military Operations – June – August 200379 
 
This distancing of Coalition forces from the population caused two 
major problems:  First, Coalition forces could not dominate all contentious areas, 
thereby providing opportunities for opposition to organize and mobilize; and 
second, contact with the local population decreased, just as the need for better 
human intelligence (HUMINT) increased.  Simultaneously, the increasing number 
of attacks forced Coalition military leadership to emphasize force protection for 
Coalition forces over contact with the Iraqi population.  This created a vicious 
circle.  Unsure of the nature and scope of the enemy, Coalition leadership 
emphasized greater force protection, which limited contact with the population, 
and further expanded the information deficit on the growing insurgency.  The                                             
79 Compiled from reports obtained from US CENTCOM News Generator, available from 
www.centcom.mil 
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growing information gap acerbated the pressures and challenges facing both 
Coalition forces, as well as the CPA.  
 
5. Intelligence – Identifying the Enemy 
The Coalition characterization of the opposition in Iraq evolved slowly over 
the life of the conflict.  Originally, U.S. senior leaders and military officials 
identified the opposition as solely made up of dead-enders or foreign terrorists.  
This initial mischaracterization placed the United States at a severe information 
disadvantage in relation to the growing insurgency.  This information 
disadvantage was caused by three primary considerations:  
• The traditional failure of a conqueror to conceive an insurgency is forming;  
• Fixation on strategic requirements centered on weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD); and  
• Failure to provide security for the Iraqi population.   
This initial information gap created in the May to August 2003 timeframe gave the 
growing opposition opportunity to expand largely unimpeded and placed the 
Coalition in an information deficit that severely impacted Coalition efforts.   
Moreover, while the opposition was mobilizing in the underground, the 
United States’ immediate focus following the conflict was on reducing troop 
strength and finding anticipated weapons of mass destruction.  As violence 
against the Coalition increased, senior leaders placed the blame on dead-enders 
and foreign terrorists.  Inadvertently, a gathering storm was developing in terms 
of a distinct information advantage for a growing opposition.  Bruce Hoffman, a 
RAND counterinsurgency expert, notes that this interpretative lens is common for 
occupying forces: 
The fact that military planners apparently didn’t consider the 
possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather 
momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a 
pathology that has long afflicted governments and militaries 
everywhere:  the failure not only to recognize the incipient 
conditions for insurgency, but also to ignore its nascent 
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manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial 
traction and in turn momentum. 80 
How significant was the information deficit?  Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh 
Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified the 
keys areas of information deficit for the United States post-conflict in Iraq: 
There is another critical set of intelligence problems which related 
to the intelligence assessment of the Iraqi opposition, the attitudes 
of the Iraq people, and the divisions within Iraq as a nation and 
which have proved to be of critical importance during conflict 
termination and the initial phases of nation building. One problem 
was that policymakers either did not want objective intelligence on 
the nature and capabilities of various elements of the external and 
internal Iraqi opposition or the intelligence community did not 
provide it.81 
Compounding the conceptualization problem for Coalition forces was the 
emphasis of intelligence activities within Iraq.  Finding and controlling weapons of 
mass destruction was clearly the number one intelligence mission.  Given the 
unshaken belief by senior administration leaders that WMD was present, this 
emphasis is understandable, yet with intelligence resources looking the other 
way, an insurgency was able to form and expand.  During meetings with senior 
DoD and Joint Task Force – 7 officials in Iraq, the situation was described that a 
full 50% of intelligence personnel serving in Iraq were dedicated to the Iraqi 
Survey Group’s mission.82  If the Iraqi Survey Group identified potential 
opposition activities, it was required to hand off this information to the newly 
formed Joint Task Force – 7 intelligence cell.  Simultaneously, Joint Task Force – 
7 was dealing with growing violence against Coalition forces and the Iraqi people.  
The response to this violence sealed the fate of the information disadvantage in 
Iraq.  
                                            
80 Bruce Hoffman. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. June 2004. Available from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP127.pdf, [August 2005].  
81 Cordesman, Anthony, Intelligence Failures in the Iraq War, July 19, 2003, pg. 43.  
Available from: http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons.pdf, [September 2004]. 
82 Author’s meetings in Iraq, 2003-2004.  Confirmed during follow-up interviews, May 2005. 
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Faced with limited understanding of the makeup and scope of the 
opposition, the Coalition implemented force protection measures to better protect 
Coalition forces.  These measures included increased emphasis on the creation 
and securing of large firebases and implementation of patrolling techniques that 
distanced Coalition troops from the Iraqi population.83  The Coalition’s change 
from presence to patrol heavily impacted the relationship between Coalition 
forces and the Iraqi populace.  The ability of an army to effectively secure the 
population establishes a relationship with the population.  The population need 
not like the army, but the population must trust that the army will protect the 
population from the insurgents.  Bruce Hoffman describes the phenomenon, “It is 
a truism of counterinsurgency that a population will give its allegiance to the side 
that will best protect it.”84  Increasingly, Coalition forces were asked to conduct 
offensive operations throughout the country, secure the cities and the 
countryside, all while still providing humanitarian assistance and point security at 
critical locations in Iraq.   
The impact of this growing chasm between the population and Coalition 
forces was an increasing information disadvantage.  Noted counterinsurgency 
and national security scholar Andrew Krepinevich recently described the 
importance of securing the population to Congress,  
The key to defeating an insurgency is to attack it at the source of its 
strength: the population. If the counterinsurgent forces can deny the 
insurgents’ access to the people, the insurgents become like fish 
out of water, denied sources of manpower and information. The 
insurgents’ problem is further compounded if the people feel secure 
enough from retribution to provide counterinsurgent forces with 
intelligence on insurgent movements and the identities of cadre 
members. The prospects for gaining such intelligence are further 
advanced if the counterinsurgent forces have won the people’s 
“hearts,” by offering them the prospect of a better way of life if the 
insurgents are defeated, in addition to having won their “minds” by 
convincing the people that the insurgents will be defeated and that 
the government can provide the personal security necessary to 
                                            
83 Author’s interview with senior DoD official and author’s meetings in Iraq during 2003 and 
2004. 
84 Hoffman, pg. 15. 
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convince individuals to provide the intelligence needed to identify 
who the insurgents are, and where they are located.85 
In Iraq, these three key developments of:  1) failure to grasp marks of a 
rising insurgency, 2) focus on weapons of mass destruction, and 3) failure to 
protect the population translated to a severe information deficit for the Coalition.  
As insufficient intelligence resources were applied to collecting and analyzing its 
emergence the impacts on the Coalition were clear and lasting.  The Jones 
Report specifically identified the intelligence shortfalls facing the Coalition in the 
period immediately following the fall of the Hussein regime: 
As commanders at all levels sought operational intelligence, it 
became apparent that the intelligence structure was undermanned, 
under-equipped, and inappropriately organized for counter-
insurgency operations. Upon arrival in July 2003, MG Barbara Fast 
was tasked to do an initial assessment of the intelligence 
architecture needed to execute the CJTF-7 mission in Iraq. 
Technical intelligence collection means alone were insufficient in 
providing the requisite information on an enemy that had adapted to 
the environment and to a high-tech opponent. Only through an 
aggressive structure of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and 
analysis could the requisite information be obtained. 
Communications equipment, computers, and access to sufficient 
bandwidth to allow reachback capabilities to national databases 
were needed to assist in the fusion and collaboration of tactical 
through strategic intelligence data. Disparate cells of different 
agencies had to be co-located to allow access to respective data 
bases to assist in the fusion and collaboration effort.86 
Military leadership responded quickly to this problem once recognized, but 
the information advantage ceded to the opposition during the May-August 2003 
timeframe gave the opposition opportunity to organize and grow.   
 
6. CPA Phase I – Impacts on the Population 
During the initial phases of the occupation, the Iraqi population took the 
brunt of increasing violence.  Figure 10 identifies the number of Iraqi civilians 
                                            
85 Krepinevich, pg. 6.  
86 Anthony Jones.  AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th 
Military Intelligence Brigade. 25 August 2004. Available from <http://www.c-
span.org/pdf/armyabughraib.pdf, [March 2005], p. 17.  
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killed as a result of war, either by opposition attacks or collateral damage as part 
of Coalition operations.  While these numbers identify the problem of lingering 
violence and attacks by the Iraqi opposition, the more surprising and damning 
numbers deal with crime-related deaths in Baghdad.   
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Figure 17.   Iraqi Civilians Killed During CPA Phase I87 
 
Crime-related numbers reflect only Baghdad.  In Baghdad 95% of all 
police officers had returned, the Coalition had added 9,000 troops to improve 
security in the nation’s capital, yet crime-related violence grew.   
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Figure 18.   Crime-related deaths in Baghdad – May – September 200388 
 
In comparison, Washington D.C.’s annual murder rate hovers around 250 
per year89 and Baghdad an estimated 5500.  When comparing the murder rate 
per 100,000, during this time frame frame, Baghdad averaged an annualized rate 
of 90 crime-related deaths per 100,000 while Washington D.C., 4390.  Within the 
region, none of the nation’s capitals have a published murder rate, but Jordan, 
with a total population of 5.6M has maintained a murder rate of 6.7 per 100,000 
nationwide.  
This apparent lack of security coincides closely with initial polls conducted 
by the Iraq Center for Research and Security Studies (ICRSS) in June 2003.  
The poll concluded:  74% described the current security situation as bad; 74% 
described the economy as bad; and 94% said that efforts to rebuild key sectors 
of the economy had so far failed.91  The increasing Iraqi discontent with the 
                                            
88 M. O'Hanlon, A. L. de Albuquerque. Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & 
Security in Post-Saddam Iraq . Feb 11 2005. Internet on-line. Available from 
<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>. [February 2005].   
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Richard Lugar, July 2003, Iraq: Meeting The Challenge, Sharing The Burden, Staying The 
Course, A Trip Report to the Members of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, available from 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2003/0730iraqreport.pdf, pg. 2, [April 
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Coalition manifested itself in other ways.  Figure 12 shows protests and riots that 
resulted in at least one Iraqi death.   
Apr 2003 May 2003 Jun 2003 Jul 2003 Aug 2003 Sep 2003
Protests/Riots Resulting in Iraqi Deaths
April-September 2003
Jun 12, 2003
Mosul - 2 killed
Jun 18, 2003
Baghdad - 2 killed
Jul 22, 2003
Mosul - 1 killed
Jul 26, 2003
Karbala - 2 killed
Aug 13, 2003
Sadr City - 1 killed
Sep 13, 2003
Nasiriyah - 1 killed
Apr 28, 2003
Fallujah - 13 killed
 
Figure 19.   Protests/Riots Resulting in Iraqi Deaths, April to September 200392 
 
In addition to the increasing violence, the Iraqi population had another 
large problem:  jobs.  In June 2003, Bremer stated: 
Unemployment today is a tremendous problem. Our best estimate 
is that before the war, the unemployment was at about 50 percent -
- five-zero percent -- and we think it's substantially higher than that 
now. So there can be no higher priority now than trying to find a 
way to create jobs. The chronic underinvestment in infrastructure is 
going to have to be dealt with, and we're going to have to find ways 
                                            
92 Information for this chart compiled from Iraq Body Count database, available from 
www.iraqbodycount.net   
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to get productive activity going, particularly economic activity that 
creates jobs.93 
CPA attempted to improve the situation through establishment of a $100M 
construction initiative implemented in mid-June 2003.94  In July, the CPA also 
reinitiated monthly payments to former Iraqi Army personnel.95  Also in July the 
Office of Management and Budget reported to Congress that the future of Iraq’s 
economy lay in the rapid move to a free-market economy.  The report said,  
The CPA’s priority will be to encourage rapid transition to an 
economy guided by free market principles. These have been 
shown, in case after case, to offer the quickest way to generate 
efficient and job-creating economic activity. The Coalition must also 
make the case for the role of foreign investment in the development 
of Iraq.96 
Converting Iraq from a rentier state to a market economy was a grand goal, but 
to do so would further increase the pressure on an Iraqi population already 
concerned with increasing violence and crime.  One segment of the population 
that the CPA could not afford to lose was the majority Shi’a population. 
 
a.  Impacts on Shi’a Community 
Critical to the success of Coalition efforts in Iraq was developing the 
trust and confidence of the Shi’a population.  As violence increased in the 
traditionally Sunni areas of Iraq, the Coalition needed stability and peaceful 
relations with the population in the traditionally Shi’a areas of Iraq.  As previously 
discussed, Coalition efforts to build bridges to the Shi’a community were initially 
hampered by two key events:  1) The death of al-Khu’i; and 2) The emergence of 
                                            
93 L. Paul Bremer, June, 2003, Briefing on Coalition Post-war Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Efforts, available from: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030612-
0269.html, [September 2004] . 
94 Joshua Bolten, July 2003 Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1506 of the Emergency 
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11), 90 Day Update Report On 
United States Strategy For Relief And Reconstruction In Iraq, available from:  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/1506.pdf, [September 2004], pg. 6. 
95 Ibid, pg.6.  
96 Ibid, pg.6. 
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Muqtada al-Sadr as the leader of the Sadr II Movement.  In this critical phase of 
occupation, the Coalition could ill afford violence emerging in the Shi’a areas.97   
At this critical juncture (May 2003), Bremer was appointed and 
immediately de-Ba’athified the country.  This first key decision was likely at least 
partially directed at the Shi’a community within Iraq.  In one pen stroke, Bremer 
eliminated all remnants of the repressive Hussein regime.  This decision 
eliminated the top layers of the Iraqi government bureaucracy, causing CPA to 
rebuild the leadership in every Iraqi ministry, severely impacting the transition to 
Iraqi control.  Yet, in defense of the decision, the UK envoy to the CPA, John 
Sawers, described the de-Ba'athification decree last summer as the “most 
popular thing the CPA had done.”98  The de’Ba’athication decision was likely 
popular within the Shi’a community, but another key governance decision placed 
Bremer at odds with the senior Shi’a religious figure in the country, Grand 
Ayatullah al-Sistani.   
Bremer’s decision to appoint the Iraqi Governing Council rather 
than prepare for a direct election caused Sistani to issue a fatwa99 decrying the 
decision.100  In short, the fatwa stated that the Coalition had no authority to 
appoint a body to write a constitution for Iraq.  Sistani called for direct elections 
so that each Iraqi citizen could select the representatives for a constitutional 
assembly.  The fatwa tied the hands of the constitution preparation committee 
and stopped their work completely.101  With a short eloquent paragraph 
espousing democracy over CPA appointments, the supposedly apolitical Sistani 
had heavily impacted the political process.  It would not be the last.  Sistani’s 
                                            
97 Anthony Cordesman, August 2003, What is Next in Iraq? Military Developments, Military 
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98 Jonathan Steele, June 2004, US Man Bows Out, Still The Optimist, The Guardian, 
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54 
importance in post-conflict Iraq cannot be overstated.  As the senior most cleric 
in the hierarchical Shi’a society, Sistani played the key role in establishing the 
direction of political events and maintaining relative calm within the Shi’a 
population.   
 
7. Steps toward successfully implementing CPA Objectives 
The growing violence in Iraq was a serious negative impact on the 
population, yet not everything was negative.  Some positives emerged providing 
hope that the situation would improve.  The figure below identifies the important 
events:  
Apr 2003 May 2003 Jun 2003 Jul 2003
Signs of Progress in Iraq May-Jul 2003
April 17 - Bechtel awarded $688M 
contract to rebuild schools, 
hospitals, and other major capital 
projects.
May 18 - Virgin Airlines announced their intent 
to fly a major shipment of Medical Aid to 
Baghad. 
May 20 - At least 53 Non-Governmental and 
Private Volunteer Organizations (NGOs) are 
operating in Baghdad in conjunction with US 
forces. Many other NGOs are operating in 
Baghdad independently to improve the overall 
situation in Iraq.
May 23 - Third Armored 
Cavalry Soldiers Seize 
Gold worth $500,000,000.
May 24 - Received first increment of Iraqi 
civil servant payments ($15 million USD) 
in Baghdad.
May 28 - Iraqi Oil Ministry is ready to open pipeline 
from Baghdad to An Najaf, containing approximately 
120M liters of benzene. Once open, 850,000/day will 
be available
May 29 - Water production is now at about 
70% of it's pre-war capability
May 31 - 8,785 Iraqi police are back to work, 
and 3Patrol Divisions and 18 Police Stations 
now operate 24-hours a day in Baghdad
June 10 - Coalition reported that the Baghdad 
Airport is due to open to commercial traffic in mid-
July.
July 13 - Iraq's interim 
governing council holds its first 
meeting
July 22 - US forces kill Uday and 
Qusay Hussein 
July 25 - Japan agrees to send 
troops to support reconstruction
May 30 - All 22 Iraqi 
universities are now re-opened
July 22 - 90% of Iraqi public schools re-opened
July 22 - All Iraqi hospitals 
and 95% health clinics open
 
Figure 20.   Positive events in Iraq, May – Jul 2003 
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These apparent positive events could not overcome the increasing violence.  In 
August, the intensity of the violence would irreversibly change the face of the 
occupation and the opposition.   
 
8. Turning point – August 2003 
The Iraqi population had endured violence and uncertainty during the early 
periods of occupation, but the worst was yet to come.  As Figure 14 indicates, 
attacks during Phase I culminated with devastating attacks in August, 2003. 
Jun 15, 2003 Jul 1, 2003 Jul 15, 2003 Aug 1, 2003 Aug 15, 2003
Major Attacks on Iraqi Civilians - CPA Phase I
Jun 30, 2003
June 30: Three blasts rock Fallujah. One at the 
Al-Hassan mosque kills a Muslim cleric and six 
theology students, injuring 15 others.
Jul 1, 2003
July 1: An explosion destroys a Sunni 
mosque in Fallujah, killing 10 Iraqis, including 
the chief cleric. Many Iraqis chant, "America is 
the enemy of God.”
Jul 5, 2003
July 5: Seven Iraqi police recruits are killed and 
40 are wounded by an explosion at a police-
training center in Ramadi.
Aug 7, 2003
August 7: A car bomb explodes outside the 
Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, killing at 
least 15 people and wounding dozens; all the 
dead were Iraqis. 
Aug 15, 2003
August 15: Saboteurs blow up a crude oil export 
pipeline in northern Iraq, sparking an enormous fire 
and halting oil exports to Turkey.
Aug 19, 2003
August 19: A truck bomb explodes outside U.N. 
headquarters in Baghdad, killing 24 people, 
including the head of the U.N. mission, Sergio 
Vieira de Mello. Over 100 are injured. The dead 
also include the Iraq coordinator for the U.N. 
children's fund, UNICEF, and several World 
Bank staffers.
Aug 29, 2003
August 29: An explosion at a Najaf Mosque kills 
about 95, including one of Iraq’s most important 
Shiite leaders, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-
Hakim. Another 125 are wounded.
 
Figure 21.   Major Iraqi Opposition Attacks Resulting in Iraqi Civilian Deaths, 
May-Aug 2003 
The two most deadly attacks killed two important figures in post-conflict 
Iraq:  Sergio Vieira de Mello, UN Chief of Mission in Iraq, and Ayatullah al-Hakim, 
a senior Shi’a cleric and head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (SCIRI).  The death of de Mello caused the United Nations to remove its 
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presence in Iraq, withdrawing an enormous opportunity for the Coalition to 
“internationalize” the occupation.  The death of Hakim and 124 other Shi’a 
worshippers outside one of the holiest Shi’a sites increased the possibility of 
sectarian violence and removed a potential ally for the Coalition.102  Figure 15 
shows the dramatic change in Iraqis killed/wounded as a result of major casualty 
bombings.   
Major Casualty Bombings 
















Figure 22.   Major Casualty Bombings – May – August 2003103 
 
This deadly new tactic was introduced by the remnants of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi’s group.104   
 
a.  Re-emergence of Zarqawi 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has seized the opportunity in Iraq to 
transition from two-bit thug to international terrorist.  Zarqawi was a relative 
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unknown outside counterterrorism circles until February 2003, when Secretary of 
State Powell announced that Zarqawi was Iraq’s tie to Al-Qaeda: 
Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and 
his al-Qaida lieutenants...Those helping to run this camp are 
Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside 
Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in 
the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam 
that controls this corner of Iraq.105 
It was in this unique status of being targeted by the United States 
that Zarqawi was provided his political opportunity.  Newsweek’s Iraq 
Correspondent, Rod Nordland, described the metamorphosis of Zarqawi, “It 
wasn’t long ago that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a two-bit thug.  The Iraq War 
gave him a platform that most terrorists can only dream of.”106  The U.S.-led 
dismantling of the Saddam Hussein regime afforded Zarqawi the opportunity to 
transition from regional terrorist to global jihadist.   
Zarqawi and his group were not able to immediately translate the 
fall of the Hussein regime into actions against the Coalition.  Targeted as part of 
the initial Coalition strikes in Iraq, Zarqawi’s safe haven with Ansar al-Islam was 
destroyed.  This may have delayed his plans, but did not destroy his existing 
mobilization structures.  Zarqawi entered Iraq with a social network of terrorist 
operatives in place.  Matthew Levitt, a former Federal Bureau of Investigation 
terrorism analyst says that, “(Zarqawi) is the most active and frenetic terrorist 
commander out there today.”107  Zarqawi’s initial attacks made a statement, one 
that the world clearly heard.   
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9. CPA Phase I - Conclusions 
The most critical development in this phase was the increase in violence 
from both opposition attacks, as well as criminal acts.  Tied closely to this upturn 
in violence were the Coalition’s decisions that impacted the number of troops for 
the occupying Coalition Forces.  The most critical of these decisions was 
Bremer’s decision to disband the Iraqi Army.   
This decision left US Central Command with few options to increase 
forces.  In August 2003, Anthony Cordesman identified the three equally, 
unappealing options: 
• More U.S. troops. 
• Turn to the U.N. for assistance 
• Create new Iraqi forces108 
He identified each of these options as unpalatable.  The U.S. was already 
engaged in Afghanistan and had already committed 150,000 troops to Iraq.  
Members of the UN with large enough force structure to significantly contribute 
had already refused support and were not likely to risk their forces in the 
deteriorating security situation.  And finally, recruitment of new Iraqi security 
forces would not produce troops in the short term in large enough numbers to 
significantly impact security.109  This left the existing Coalition Forces and the 
ragtag remnants of the Iraqi police to deal with the threat.110 
MG Ray Odierno, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, outlined the 
scope of the task facing his forces in June 2003: 
Right now, over 27,000 troops of Task Force Iron Horse stand 
vigilant throughout a sprawling area that encompasses three 
provinces in northeastern and central Iraq. Our area of 
responsibility stretches from just north of Baghdad to the Iranian 
border in the east, and stretches north to the oil fields north of 
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Kirkuk and includes Taji, Tikrit, Samarra and Balad, and west to 
Lake Tharthar. This is an area comparable in size to the state of 
West Virginia.  Since Task Force Iron Horse arrived in the area of 
operations in late March, Iron Horse soldiers have conducted 
combat operations against the Iraqi army, paramilitary and Ba'ath 
Party forces, and simultaneously, we have conducted stability 
operations that have had a significant impact in reducing the 
suffering of free Iraqi citizens and set the initial conditions for the 
return to normalcy in Iraq.  Although major combat operations have 
concluded, our soldiers are involved in almost daily contact with 
noncompliant forces, former regime members and common 
criminals. To defeat these attacks and to continue to improve the 
security and stability within our area, the task force is conducting 
search and attack missions, presence patrols and raids to disarm, 
defeat and destroy hostile forces, as well as to capture the former 
regime members.111 
The number of 4th ID troops identified by MG Odierno does not indicate how 
many of the 27,000 troops were combat forces engaged in active operations.  
This number likely includes the division headquarters staff and support personnel 
not available for combat operations.   
Coalition policies, such as disbanding the Iraqi Army, combined with the 
minimalist approach to resources in the ORHA and CPA Phase I, placed 
Coalition troops at a distinct disadvantage.  Added to the challenge were 
Coalition policies on economic reconstruction.  The large scale reconstruction 
projects initiated by USAID made long-term sense, but did little to produce 
employment in the short term.  Without the resources on hand to return portions 
of the Iraqi Army to work and limited employment prospects, the Iraqi Army was 
returned to the Iraqi populace with at least some military training and no 
prospects for employment.  Increasing unemployment and a lack of pervasive 
security forces added to the difficulties facing the Coalition.  In effect, the 
challenges facing the Iraqi population and the nascent Coalition created a 
situation that had predictable results.   
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10. T.E. Lawrence:  Foretelling the Outcome 
In his book, retelling the lessons from the adventures of Lawrence of 
Arabia, T.E. Lawrence succinctly captured the conditions required for fostering 
revolt in Arab lands.  Had Coalition polices inadvertently created these 
conditions?  Lawrence identifies the conditions, the rebellion must have: 
• An unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but 
from the fear of it 
• A sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of 
occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage 
• [An occupier] too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate 
the whole area effectively from fortified posts 
• The few active rebels must have qualities of speed and endurance, 
ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply 
• [The rebels] must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyze 
the enemy’s organized communication 
• A friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point 
of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy 
Were these conditions present during the occupation period, April – August 
2003? 
11.  Applying Lawrence’s Framework to Iraq 
The characteristics of the occupying Army were undoubtedly present.  The 
number of Coalition troops could not immediately fulfill the doctrine of acreage, 
not in terms of security for the population.  The increasing attacks by the 
opposition in the face of stepped up Coalition military operations proved the 
speed and endurance of the opposition; while the technical equipment to conduct 
attacks was readily available in the form of vast amounts of ordinance and 
ammunition left over from the Hussein regime.  The two remaining elements:  a 
secure base of operations and support of the population are less clear.  
As discussed previously, at the outset of the occupation, Coalition forces 
operated at a distinct information disadvantage.  The Coalition had chosen 
offensive operations and aggressive patrolling in an attempt to round up the 
dead-enders and former regime leaders.  The Coalition did not have a clear 
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understanding of the opposition and sources for its growth.  In essence, this 
information deficit provided a blanket of security for the opposition.  Over time, 
this ability of the enemy to evade Coalition forces and press additional violence 
upon the Coalition and the population would eventually develop into secure 
operating areas; no-go zones,112 such as Fallujah and Samarra.113 
The final condition is perhaps the most critical.  The role of the population 
in Iraq was in doubt during this time frame.  The first scientific polls were 
conducted in August 2003 and provide a window into the conflicted thoughts of 
the population toward the Coalition and the growing opposition. 
 
12. Views of the Population toward the Coalition 
The Coalition may have been met as liberators, but by August confidence 
was waning in the Coalition.  Table 12 shows the results of Oxford Research’s 
first poll of the Iraqi populace.   
August 2003:  How much confidence do you have in the following organizations? 
 CPA Occupation forces 
Great Deal 7.0% 7.6% 
Quite a lot 19.6% 13.6% 
Not Very Much 29.9% 22.2% 
None at all 43.5% 56.6% 
Table 5.   Iraqi population’s view of the Coalition – August 2003114 
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The same poll also identified what issues were important to Iraqis four 
months into the occupation.   The population’s priorities are identified in Table 2.  
Plainly, the population’s highest priority was regaining public security.  
Interestingly, from the same Oxford Research poll is the result of the following 
question:  Which of the following is no priority at all?  A full 91% of those 
surveyed said that their lowest priority is dealing with the members of the former 
regime.  While the Coalition searched for the “deck of cards” was the Coalition 
losing the population?   
 
August 2003:  Please tell me your priorities for the next 12 months? 
 First priority Second priority Third priority 
Regaining public security 67.3% 10.3% 10.3% 
Rebuild infrastructure 8.7% 32.4% 32.4% 
Following religious ideals 5.0% 6.1% 6.1% 
Iraqi self-governance 4.6% 9.1 9.1 
Reviving economy 4.1% 13.6% 13.6% 
Ensure that population can 
earn a decent living  
3.8% 15.0% 20.0% 
Table 6.   Iraqi population’s priorities – August 2003115 
 
Lawrence also tells us that:  “Rebellions can be made by 2 percent active 
in a striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”116  The initial Oxford 
polling data showed that significant portions of the population still had some 
confidence in the CPA and Coalition forces.  Other polls from the August – 
September 2003 timeframe suggest that the population was not yet lost.  A USA 
Today/Gallup poll identified that 62% of Baghdad residents felt that ousting 
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Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships endured since the invasion.  The poll 
also reflects the challenges of the security situation in Baghdad:117 
• 86% have been afraid to go outside their home during the previous 
four weeks; and 
• 94% felt that Baghdad is a more dangerous place now (Sept 2003) 
than before the invasion 
Finally, the poll showed the conflicted views of the population toward Coalition 
forces.  A clear majority (71%) felt that U.S. troops should stay longer in Iraq, yet 
36% believed that attacks on the Coalition forces are sometimes justified.118   
As the initial phase of CPA’s occupation came to a close, enormous 
challenges remained, many of which were created by initial Coalition policies.  
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency expert, Bruce Hoffman, described this 
period of the Iraq occupation as a time when the U.S.-led Coalition “lost a critical 
window of opportunity.”119  The initial policies adopted by the post-conflict 
leadership placed Coalition forces at a severe disadvantage.  Coalition forces 
responded with aggressive offensive operations and patrolling, a tactic that 
attempted to eliminate the opposition before it expanded.  Left to feel the brunt of 
Coalition policies and tactics was the Iraqi population.  Not all of the population 
was lost during this period, but undoubtedly the seeds were sown.  Coalition 
policies and tactics impacted areas of the country differently.  The varied 
dynamics present in both the Sunni-dominated center of Iraq, as well as the Shi’a 
south provided opposition forces different opportunities to mobilize.  Within the 
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IV.    THE SADR II MOVEMENT 
 
 
A. AN ORGANIZATIONAL FIGHT FOR LEGITIMACY WITHIN THE IRAQI 
SHI’A COMMUNITY  
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Shi’a population in Iraq was 
overnight converted from disenfranchised minority to an emboldened majority.  
This rapid devolution of power within Iraq, created organizational conflict within 
the Shi’a community as leaders vied for authority.  Within the Shi’a religious 
hierarchy an unexpected force emerged, Muqtada al-Sadr.  Using social 
movement theory120 as a framework for analysis, I will examine the Sadr II 
movement in the context of political opportunity, organization, and the framing 
used to mobilize support.  While Sunni-based insurgents and foreign elements 
led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi have contributed the predominance of violent 
actions against the Coalition, Muqtada al-Sadr represents the only named, public 
figure that stands in opposition to the Coalition and the emerging Iraqi 
government.  While the August 2004 standoff in Najaf and the January 2005 
elections produced setbacks for the Sadr II movement, the same mobilization 
structures and message that motivated his following remains as a potentially 
strong, violent opposition to a budding Iraqi democracy. 
 
1. Sadr II Movement: Opportunities and Mobilizing Structures121 
Muqtada al-Sadr is the leader of the Shi’a opposition in Iraq which 
demanded expulsion of Coalition forces and creation of an Iraqi theocratic 
government.  His rise to prominence within the Shi’a community largely went 
unnoticed by the United States government.  In retrospect, a leader emerging 
from the al-Sadr school of Islamic thought should not have been a surprise, but 
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the emergence of young, Muqtada al-Sadr as the leader could not have been 
anticipated.122  Muqtada al-Sadr has assumed the mantle as “speaking cleric” 
demanding a more activist role for Iraqi Shi’a leaders.  In doing so, he continues 
the opposition to secular government begun by his father-in-law123, Muhammad 
Baqir al-Sadr (killed by the Hussein regime in 1982)124 and his father Muhammad 
Sadiq al-Sadr (killed by the Hussein regime in 1999).125   
The Shi’a community in Iraq has endured repression and subjugation for 
over 100 hundred years.  Beginning with the Sunni-dominated Ottoman Empire 
and continuing through the rule of Saddam Hussein, the Shi’a have experienced 
discrimination and oppression.  Recent history in Saddam’s Iraq has been 
particularly brutal. 
Following the Shi’a revolution in Iran, the Hussein government feared the 
rise of a sympathetic movement developing in Iraq.126  At that time, the Al-Dawa 
al-Islayiyya Party espoused such a position.  One of al-Dawa’s leaders was 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who had separated his activist message from the 
traditional, apolitical message of the leading clerics in Shi’a shrine cities of Najaf 
and Karbala.  In the aftermath of Khomeni’s Revolution in Iran, Saddam Hussein 
had Muhammad Baqir-al Sadr killed.  Prior to his death, Baqir al-Sadr guided his 
cousin, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr though his Islamic studies, graduating him as 
an independent scholar of legal reasoning in 1977.  Sadiq al-Sadr continued his 
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studies and by the mid-1990s began calling for an Iraqi state governed by Islamic 
law.127    
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr attacked the Hussein regime, clearly 
distinguishing him from traditional, apolitical Shi’a leaders, such as Grand 
Ayatullah al-Sistani.  Sadiq al-Sadr called himself the “speaking jurisprudent” and 
labeling Shi’a leaders in Najaf, “silent jurisprudents.”128  In doing so, Sadiq al-
Sadr created a growing following, particularly among urban Iraqi youth.  
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr defied the Hussein regime, organizing Friday prayers, 
which had been forbidden in Shi’a mosques.  Iraq sociologist Faleh A. Jabar 
described Sadiq al-Sadr’s growing popularity: 
Al-Sadr was originally a handpicked government appointee, but he 
grew publicly critical of Ba’ath Party rule in his widely attended 
sermons.  For the first time in a generation, a Shi’ite imam built vast 
networks of followers among the peasantry and the urban middle 
classes, and forged an alliance with influential urban merchants 
and tribal chieftans129.   
Eventually, Sadiq al-Sadr’s defiance cost him his life.  In early 1999, he 
was gunned down while traveling to his office in Najaf.  The successor to Sadiq 
al-Sadr, Ayatullah Kazim al-Hairi, studied in Qom, Iran, far from the base of the 
Sadr movement.130  While it appeared that the Sadr movement had been broken, 
in reality the Sadr movement survived but had been forced to the underground.  
Within the underground, Muqtada al-Sadr seized the opportunity to ascend to the 
leadership of the Sadr movement.   
In his analysis of potential Shi’a leaders that could emerge in post-
Saddam Iraq, Faleh A. Jabar anticipated the re-emergence of the Sadr II 
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movement.131 What he did not anticipate was the role Sadiq al-Sadr’s 20-
something132 son would play as leader of growing numbers of disenfranchised 
youth.  Muqtada al-Sadr’s ascendancy to the role of accepted leader of the Sadr 
movement seemed highly unlikely.  At the time of the U.S. invasion, Muqtada al-
Sadr, was likely under the age of 30, had not yet completed his Islamic studies, 
and had been almost unknown in the West.  His personal opportunity was 
ordained by three key events:  1. The death of his father; 2. The decision by 
Ayatullah Kazim al-Hai’ri to remain in Iran; and 3. Al-Hai’ri’s subsequent 
designation of Muqtada al-Sadr as his representative in Iraq.  Muqtada al-Sadr 
seized the opportunity to lead the Sadr II movement.  The political opportunity for 
the Sadr movement was provided by the U.S.-led Coalition.  The toppling of the 
Hussein regime created a power vacuum in urban Shi’a areas, which was quickly 
filled by the Sadr II movement.   
Under Muqtada al-Sadr’s leadership, the Sadr movement contrasted itself 
with the positions of other Shi’a leaders.  These leaders included:  Grand 
Ayatullah al-Sistani (an Oracle of Emulation representing traditional Shi’a 
jurisprudence), Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (leader of Iranian-based Supreme 
Council for Islamic Republic of Iraq), and Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i (son of revered 
Najaf scholar Grand Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i).  In this group, Muqtada al-
Sadr and his growing vanguard of young clerics positioned the Sadr II movement 
as the strongest advocate for an Iraqi Islamic state governed by Islamic law 
without the interference of foreign powers.   
While the 1990’s Sadr movement of Sadiq al-Sadr never reached the 
following of Grand Ayatullah al-Sistani or al-Khu’i, Sadiq al-Sadr’s followers 
created a tight-knit network of mosque leaders prepared to respond to Muqtada 
al-Sadr’s call.  This call went out even before Baghdad’s fall.   
Based on the rapidity of action, Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement was 
prepared to act.  According to Juan Cole, al-Sadr “established the most effective 
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religious opposition movement in Iraq.”133  As U.S. tanks dashed across Iraq, 
Muqtada al-Sadr and his vanguard of like-minded clerics reactivated mosques, 
deployed a militia, assumed control of regional Ba’ath Party institutions, and 
prepared social services.  While traditional leaders in Najaf waited for Saddam to 
topple, Sadrist clerics opened mosques closed by the Ba’athists for Friday 
prayers.  Al-Sadr focused his efforts in the Shi’a slums of Sadr City (renamed 
from Saddam City after the fall of Baghdad), Kufa, as well as the Shi’a holy city of 
Najaf.   
Sadr used “mosques and Sadr movement preachers” as the primary 
mobilizing structures.  As evidence of the advanced preparation, on April 9, 2003, 
Ayatullah Kazim al-Hai’ri (Sadiq al Sadr’s designate) recognized Muqtada al-Sadr 
as his representative in Iraq.  Even as Baghdad was being liberated, Sadr 
established his legitimacy to lead the Sadr II movement.  As Sadr’s militia 
patrolled the streets of Sadr City and Kufa in April 2003, Sadr and his like-minded 
clerics crafted the message to rally and sustain the Sadr legacy.   
 
2.  Frames of the Sadrist Movement134 
In a brilliant move, Muqtada al-Sadr used frames provided by an already 
trusted and martyred source, his father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr.  Muqtada al-
Sadr declared that only the rulings issued by Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (and by 
extension al-Hai’ri) were to be followed.  By doing so, he attempted to discredit 
the rulings of Grand Ayatullahs al-Sistani and al-Hakim, while also deftly avoiding 
the issue of his lack of religious credentials.   
Sadrist mosque leaders, who led prayers on 9 April, echoed the message 
of Sadiq al-Sadr: 
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• Loyal, devout Iraqis live by Islamic law 
• Oppose foreign influence 
• Iraqi clerics who fled Iraq abrogated their responsibilities 
• Clerics not born in Iraq (al-Sistani) should not speak for Iraqis 
• God (not the U.S. Coalition) freed the Iraqi people 
This message provided the foundation for the cultural frames that Sadr 
would use to create a unique collective identity.   
The foundation of Muqtada al-Sadr’s ideology and message is Shi’a Islam, 
specifically an activist, puritanical view espoused by his father.135  All other 
frames and movement actions flow from this idea.  In doing so, Muqtada al-
Sadr’s movement focused on distinguishing itself from other leaders within the 
Iraqi Shi’a community, as well as the U.S.-led Coalition.  All supporting frames 
focused on actions and symbols that distinguish Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr II 
movement from traditional Iraqi Shi’a jurisprudents.  What results is an intra-
community (Iraqi Shi’a) fight for credibility and stature.136  Quintan Wiktorowicz 
describes this phenomenon in Islamic movements as: 
A movement group…asserts its authority to speak on behalf of an 
issue or constituency by emphasizing the perceived knowledge, 
character, and logic of its popular intellectuals while attacking those 
of rivals.  Four basic framing strategies relevant to the credibility of 
popular intellectuals are identified:  1) vilification—demonizing 
popular intellectuals; 2) exaltation—praising in-group popular 
intellectuals; 3) credentialing—emphasizing the expertise of the in-
group intellectuals; and 4) de-credentialing—raising a question 
about the expertise of rivals.137 
While Wiktorowicz’s research focuses on the role of credibility within a 
Sunni context, his framework holds true for analyzing Shi’a Iraq.  Muqtada al-
Sadr initiated a “competition for resources and symbolic leadership” within the 
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Shi’a community in Iraq.138  Each of these strategies has been employed by the 
Sadr II movement to improve the stature of Muqtada al-Sadr, while attempting to 
mitigate the influence of far more senior, traditional Shi’a jurisprudents.   
Separating the Sadr II movement from traditional Shi’a clerics, Muqtada 
al-Sadr moved rapidly to provide services, while simultaneously vilifying rival 
jurisprudents.  The Sadrists moved quickly following the fall of the Hussein 
regime to claim legitimacy.  While the Sadrists filled a gap in Shi’a slums, offering 
social service support and establishing security patrols, their most significant 
action was holding Friday prayers, as early as 9 April 2003.  In doing so, Sadrist 
clerics distinguished themselves from supporters of Grand Ayatullah al-Sistani, 
who chose not to hold prayers until security had improved throughout the 
country.  Additionally, Sadr attacked al-Sistani for remaining apolitical in the face 
of the Coalition occupation, labeling al-Sistani “apolitical because he is not an 
Iraqi.”139  Similarly, the Sadr Movement vilified other Shi’a jurisprudents, such as 
al-Hakim and al-Khu’i because they had fled Hussein’s Iraq in exile. 
In contrast, the Sadrists also exalted the teachings of Muqtada’s father.  
The Sadr II movement also quickly emphasized the legitimacy of Muhammad 
Sadiq al-Sadr’s message.  Saddam City was renamed Sadr City in tribute to 
Sadiq al-Sadr, his picture placed on every street corner, and mosque leaders 
echoed his message.  Given the lack of a senior Islamic scholar within the Sadr II 
movement, the movement instead focused on the message of the martyred 
Sadiq al-Sadr, with Muqtada al-Sadr declaring that only the legal rulings of Sadiq 
al-Sadr were to be followed.140   
For the Sadr II movement, credentialing was a challenge.  Traditionally, 
the Iraqi Shi’a community is very hierarchical.  Islamic scholars labor for years to 
receive their credentials as Islamic jurisprudents, ultimately being conferred with 
the title of “Oracle of Emulation.”  Muqtada al-Sadr has not completed his studies 
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and does not have the authority to issue legal rulings.  To overcome this 
limitation, the Movement instead focused on the legal rulings of Muhammad 
Sadiq al-Sadr, as the only true representative of the Shi’a community.  The 
message is powerful, Sadiq al-Sadr was an Iraqi, Sadiq al-Sadiq did not retreat 
into exile, and Sadiq al-Sadr gave his life for Iraqis by standing up to the Hussein 
regime.  The irony in the message is that for Muqtada al-Sadr to claim legitimacy 
to this legacy, it required Sadiq al-Sadr’s envoy in Iran (al-Hai’ri) to designate 
Muqtada al-Sadr as the Sadrist representative in Iraq.141   
If credentialing the youthful Muqtada al-Sadr was a challenge, in Shi’a 
Iraq, questioning the expertise of senior clerics, such as Grand Ayatullah al-
Sistani was by far the most difficult frame to support.  To do so, the Sadrists did 
not challenge rival clerics by questioning their scholarly legitimacy, but rather 
developed sub-frames to weaken these leaders’ moral authority.  These sub-
frames focused on four themes:  anti-coalition, foreign influence, moral courage, 
and exclusivity of faith.   
The Sadrists attacked the “silent jurisprudents” in Najaf for not speaking 
out against the Coalition.  Within days of the fall of Baghdad, Sadrist clerics 
called for the rapid departure of the Coalition.  At the same time, they castigated 
traditional Shi’a clerics, such as al-Sistani and al-Hakim for remaining quiet.  
Muqtada al-Sadr used his father’s martyrdom at the hands of Saddam as the 
symbol of the only Shi’a religious movement willing to risk death to free the Iraqi 
people.  He attacked al-Sistani as being a foreigner (having been born in Iran), 
al-Hakim for his ties to Iran, and al-Khu’i for living in exile.  He accused all of 
them as being “silent” and complicit with the American occupation.  While 
attacking these leaders on moral grounds, Sadr also distinguished the Sadrist 
vision for Shi’a Iraq from those of his rivals.  The highly puritanical, shari’a-based 
Islamic state that Sadr envisioned was in sharp contrast to the apolitical views of 
traditional Najaf.  This exclusivity was used to mobilize Shi’a (in particular the 
youth) as activists in the emerging Sadr II movement.   
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In the battle for organizational control of the Iraqi Shi’a population, the 
Sadr II movement successfully used multiple frames to mobilize collective action.   
 
3.  Repertoires of Action142 
The Sadr II movement leveraged its mobilizing structures very early in the 
occupation, rapidly producing repertoires of collective action that distinguished 
the Sadrists from traditional Najaf.  Charles Tilly in his book, The Politics of 
Collective Violence, described the nature of violence within contentious politics:   
Collective violence occupies a perilous but coherent place in 
contentious politics.  It emerges from the ebb and flow of collective 
claim making and struggles for power.  It interweaves incessantly 
with nonviolent politics, varies systematically with political regimes, 
and changes as a consequence of essentially the same causes that 
operate in nonviolent zones of collective political life.143 
The analysis of the Sadr II movement’s collective action will focus on this 
“interweaving” of violent and non-violent collective action as part of a larger of a 
larger organizational struggle for control within the Iraqi Shi’a community.   
Muqtada al-Sadr successfully mixed a range of non-violent actions as part 
of the movement’s contentious actions.  As early as April 19, 2003, Sadrists 
demonstrated against the U.S.-led occupation.144  The Sadrist mosques also 
became a central hub for social services.  In August 2003, Juan Cole reported: 
Observers on the ground report that the Sadr Movement controls 
the major mosques, Shi’ite community centers, hospitals, and soup 
kitchens in East Baghdad, Kufa, and Samarra, and has a strong 
presence in Najaf, Karbala, and Basra, as well.  It is highly 
networked, and its preachers have taken a strong rhetorical line 
against what they view as an Anglo-American occupation.145 
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The Sadrists extended the use of non-violence to include providing 
security within Shi’a areas unoccupied by the Coalition forces.  These non-violent 
acts challenged the role of the Coalition.  While these non-violent acts reinforced 
the Sadr message, it was violent contention that the Sadr Movement directly 
challenged the Coalition.   
Immediately following the U.S. “thunder run” into Baghdad, the Sadr II 
movement embraced violence as a repertoire of collective action.  As previously 
discussed, the mosque was the foundation of mobilization within the Sadr II 
movement.  Mosques became not only a mobilization structure, but a powerful 
symbol for the movement.  In particular, the historic mosques in Najaf and 
Karbala were used by the Sadr II movement as symbols in both non-violent and 
violent collective action.  While the Sadrists’ most significant and violent 
collective actions occurred in stand-offs with the Coalition in 2004, the Sadr II 
movement had in fact used violent actions, as early as April 2003, to expand the 
movement.   
As the Hussein regime fell, Sadrists filled the power vacuum in Shi’a 
slums.  Sadrist militias liberated weapons and began patrolling areas as a 
security force.  While Sadrists were providing security in Sadr City and Kufa, 
some of Sadr’s most loyal (and violent) supporters in Najaf quickly turned to 
violence.  The Imam Ali shrine in Najaf is one of the holiest Shi’a sites in Iraq.  
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam’s forces had used the mosque as a 
safe haven to attack advancing U.S. forces.  Once Saddam’s fedayeen fled the 
mosque, the mosque was controlled by a Sadr II militia.  It was here on April 10, 
2003 that Sadrists would use violence as a means of contention in the Shi’a 
organizational conflict.  
When attempting to gain access to the Imam Ali mosque controlled by 
Sadr Movement forces, Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i was the first casualty of 
organizational violence.  Al’Khu’i, the son of the former Object of Emulation, 
challenged the Sadr forces and attempted to gain control of the mosque.  An 
Iraqi journalist describes the scene: 
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An angry crowd gathered in the square outside the shrine, chanting 
slogans in favor of Muqtada al-Sadr. Determined to prevent Kalidar 
from becoming established at the shrine, they demanded that he be 
surrendered to them. They were also enraged that al-Khu’i was 
accompanied by Mahir al-Yasiri, an Iraqi Shi'ite settled in Dearborn, 
Michigan, who was part of an expatriate group helping the US 
forces and who was wearing a US flack jacket. The encounter 
became a firefight when someone in al-Khu’i's party, perhaps al-
Khu’i himself, fired a pistol over the heads of the Sadr Movement 
mob. They replied with gunfire, killing al-Yasiri. Eyewitness Ma'd 
Fayyad says that after an hour-long standoff, al-Khu’i and his party 
surrendered. He then maintains that al-Khu’i and others were 
bound and taken to Muqtada al-Sadr's house, but that the latter 
declined to admit them and that the word came back out that they 
should be killed in the square. Fayyad admits, however, that he had 
loosened his ropes and escaped before this point, so that he may 
have had this story second hand. Other accounts suggest a more 
spontaneous mob action, in which the crowd closed on al-Khu’i and 
Kalidar and stabbed them to death.146 
An Iraqi judge investigated the incident and determined that the “mob” was 
in fact operating under the guidance of Muqtada al-Sadr, issuing a warrant for 
Sadr’s arrest for the death of al-Khu’i.147  According to the judge, Sadr’s militia 
brought al-Khu’i to Sadr’s Najaf headquarters to seek guidance from al-Sadr.  
Reportedly, they were told, “Take him away and kill him in your special way.”148  
Whether the Sadrist actions were those of an angry mob or the action of a 
controlled militia is now largely irrelevant.  This event provides the backdrop for 
future violent confrontations between the Sadr movement and the Coalition; 
strategic interactions that would increase the stature of Muqtada al-Sadr and the 
Sadr II movement.  
In early summer 2003, Muqtada al-Sadr announced the formation of the 
Mahdi Army, his own militia to counter the American occupation.149  The Mahdi 
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Army would confront Coalition forces throughout 2004.  Having begun the conflict 
as a relatively unknown junior cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr continued to use violence 
as contention against the Coalition forces.  While a senior U.S. commander 
described Muqtada al-Sadr as, “a poser, a little boy playing cleric”, al-Sadr 
continued to defy U.S. forces.150  Figure 23 provides a timeline of these 
confrontations with U.S. forces.  
Apr 2003 Jul 2003 Oct 2003 Jan 2004 Apr 2004 Jul 2004
Apr 10, 2003
Al-Khu'i murdered in Najaf
Aug 1, 2003
Judge issues arrest warrant for al-Sadr
Apr 4, 2004
Mahdi militia overruns Sadr City police 
stations
Mar 28, 2004
Coalition arrests Sadr aide and 
shuts down Sadrist newspaper
Oct 2003
Sadr announces creation of his own government
Aug 4, 2004
Sadr and his militia control 
Imam Ali shrine in Najaf
Aug 28, 2004
Sistani negotiates Mahdi withdrawl from shrine
Cease-fire declared
Sep 1, 2004
Sadr's mentor, al-Hai'ri withdraws 
support from Sadr movement
Jun 2004
Sadr forces occupy Imam Ali shrine
Oct 10, 2004
Mahdi Army agrees to 
disarm, begins weapon turn-in
Figure 23.   Timeline of Sadrist Collective Action, April 2003 – Nov 2004 
 
The final confrontation with Coalition forces in August 2004 was by far the 
most deadly, in which Sadr forces took control of the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf.  
Ultimately, hundreds of Sadr supporters were killed during this standoff, which 
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ended with an agreement brokered by Sadr’s rival, Grand Ayatullah al-Sistani.  
Following this agreement, Sadr agreed to disarm his militia. 
While Grand Ayatullah al-Sistani does not support Sadr or his agenda, the 
Sadr Movement did potentially benefit from Sistani’s non-violent contention 
against specific Coalition policies.  In January 2004, Sistani issued a fatwa 
denouncing the Coalition Provisional Authority’s plan for phase handover of 
sovereignty to an Iraqi government.  Overnight hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators took to the streets in protest.151  Unbelievably, the U.S. led 
Coalition was on the wrong end of the transition to democracy; the Iraqis 
demanded democracy and the Coalition’s plan delayed it.  It is likely that these 
demonstrations included segments of the Shi’a population that previously had not 
demonstrated with Sadr against the Coalition, potentially increasing oppositional 
consciousness within a new segment of the Shi’a population.   
 
B. EVALUATING THE SADR II MOVEMENT 
Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr II Movement are competing in an 
organizational fight for leadership within the Iraqi Shi’a community.152  The 
Sadrist mobilization structures, frames, and repertoires of action center on 
increasing the stature of Muqtada al-Sadr within the Iraqi Shi’a population.  How 
successful has the Sadr Movement been in gaining ground on the traditional 
Shi’a leadership?  In polling conducted by the Oxford Research International in 
February 2004, only 1.5% of Iraqis surveyed identified Muqtada al-Sadr as the 
leader they most trusted.  By June 2004, Sadr was identified as most trusted by 
7.4% of those surveyed.  In comparison, Grand Ayatullah al-Sistani received 
10% support from those surveyed.  While the numbers are not enormous, Sadr’s 
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rise from unknown to a significant opposition leader was meteoric.  This increase 
in stature may have caused Sadr to overreach in August 2004. 
Sistani’s diffusing of the Najaf standoff in August 2004 was seen as an 
enormous victory for the apolitical Sistani and a great defeat for Muqtada al-Sadr.  
While the Najaf defeat and the success of the January 2005 elections did not 
enhance Sadr’s status, it is important to note that Sadr represents a unique 
political space within Iraq.  Muqtada al-Sadr is the only public figure who has 
consistently opposed the Coalition.  All of the Sadr Movement’s mobilization 
structures remain in place; Sadr is positioned to reinitiate his frames and 
repertoires if the new Iraqi government falters.   
 Demonstrations in Iraq organized by the Sadr Movement reiterate Sadr’s 
staying power.  In April 2005, tens of thousands of Shi’a protestors marked the 
anniversary of Baghdad’s fall by marching in the streets against the U.S. led 
occupation.153  The use of mosques as a core mobilization structure will serve as 
a continued hub to preach Sadr’s message to the Shi’a population.  The recent 
demonstrations by the Sadr Movement reemphasize the significance of his fight 
for leadership within the Shi’a community.  The Sadrist frames and actions, while 
sometimes directed at U.S. forces and the Coalition, reinforce Sadr’s fight for 
Shi’a community leadership.   
 In summary, the Sadr II Movement seized the opportunity to mobilize 
support within the Shi’a community.  Muqtada al-Sadr led the movement to fill a 
vacuum created by the fall of the Hussein regime and unfilled by the Coalition.  
Leveraging these mobilization structures, the Sadr II Movement used collective 
action against the Coalition as a frame within the organizational struggle being 
waged against other Shi’a leaders.  In doing so, Muqtada al-Sadr attempted to 
distinguish himself from the apolitical Grand Ayatullah al-Sistani and other Shi’a 
leaders.  Sadr’s early success in filling uncontested physical and information 
space within Shi’a areas of Iraq, likely let the Sadr II Movement to overreach in 
its attempt to occupy the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf.                                               
153 Antonio Castaneda.  2005.  “Sadr Supporters Demand U.S. Pull Out from Iraq.”  
Washington Post, (9 April).  
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 Similar to the mobilization opportunities afforded the Sadr II Movement, 
the Sunni-based opposition benefited from the emergence of uncontested 
physical and information space.  As both the Shi’a and Sunni opposition 
benefited from initial Coalition policies and tactics, the two movements vary 
greatly in terms of vision for a future Iraq.  The Sadr II Movement has espoused a 
vision for a Shi’a led theocracy, while the Sunni-based opposition has no unifying 
vision or message.  This critical distinction acts as a self-limiter on the future 
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 V.   ANALYSIS OF SUNNI-BASED OPPOSITION IN IRAQ 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Coalition characterization of the opposition in Iraq has evolved slowly 
over the life of the conflict.  Originally, U.S. senior leaders and military officials 
identified the opposition as dead-enders or foreign terrorists.  As the outline of 
the opposition became somewhat clearer, this characterization began to evolve.  
Today, the opposition is generalized into three groups:  Sunni, Shi’a militias in 
the form of the Sadr II movement, and foreign terrorists.  While this 
generalization is not perfect, it is the characterization that I will use to examine 
Iraqi opposition to U.S. forces, specifically focusing on the creation and growth of 
forces in Sunni areas opposing the Coalition in Iraq.  Using social movement 
theory154 as a framework for analysis, I will examine opposition groups in the 
context of political opportunity, organization, and the framing used to mobilize 
support.  Analysis of the opposition will focus on the Sunni-based insurgents, 
examining their growth since the fall of Saddam Hussein, as well as draw 
conclusions on current trends the new Iraqi government, Iraqi Security forces, 
and Coalition forces are capitalizing upon to weaken the Sunni-based opposition.   
 
B. SUNNI OPPOSITION GROUPS 
To identify Iraqi indigenous groups as Sunni is a gross 
mischaracterization.  A better description would be either opposition groups 
operating in traditionally Sunni areas, or groups representing Iraqis who are no 
longer in power.  The challenge in defining these groups is the complexity of the 
society and the mix of tribal, religious, and Ba’athist impact on the Iraqi 
population.   
After the close of major combat operations in 2003, the United States and 
the Interim Iraqi government regarded Iraqi insurgents primarily as disaffected 
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Quintan. 2004. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington, Ind.: 
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former Ba’athists.  Jim Kuvalcaba, a Tufts University military scholar, offers a 
more generalized characterization of the former regime elements as 
“Preservationists [who] employ asymmetric means to attack selected targets to 
discredit the government and cause disenfranchisement among the 
population.”155  Indeed, a list of most wanted in Iraq, released in February 2005, 
is largely made up of former regime officials, indicating that both authority figures 
view many Ba’athist groups as problematic at best.   
It is clear, however, that Ba’athist groups comprised of former regime 
officials do not constitute the full extent of Sunni-based opposition to US 
presence in Iraq and the emerging Iraqi government.  Other groups that are 
ideologically closer to Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda are also involved, such as Ansar al-
Sunah.  Such groups have actively opposed US and interim Iraqi government 
actions in Iraq, from direct violence against US and Iraqi government personnel 
and leading boycotts of the January 2005 national Iraqi elections.   
Unfortunately, complexities of Iraqi society, such as overlapping social and 
power networks, confound straightforward analysis of Iraqi opposition groups.  
Specifically, Sunni-based opposition groups in Iraq are not easily distinguished, 
and information on specific group composition is scarce.  As a result, I approach 
analysis of these various groups at a macro, aggregate level, using the rubric of 
social movement theory to inform the analysis.  I contend that the anti-Coalition 
movement that has emerged within the predominantly Sunni territories offers a 
particularly illustrative case study, especially when considering uncontested 
political space, the resulting impacts on the growth of the opposition within Iraq, 
and the emergence of multiple sovereignties156 in areas by-passed by the 
Coalition during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  This paper offers key highlights 
from the case study in the hopes of enhancing our understanding of the 
insurgency. 
                                            
155 Jim Ruvalcaba. Understanding Iraq's Insurgency. 2004. Available from 
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1.  Political Opportunity for Sunni-based Groups 
Political opportunity available to the Sunni-based opposition after the fall 
of the Hussein regime, came in three forms:  1) an imperfect end to the conflict, 
2) insurgent information advantage, and 3) decreasing Coalition presence in 
Sunni areas.  
The war in Iraq ended with a whimper.  Military historian John Keegan 
describes the phenomenon of an Iraqi Army that in some areas of the country 
disappeared.157  Moreover, the conflict did not end with an unconditional 
surrender by political or military leaders.  The leadership evaporated, leaving the 
Coalition to declare victory by unseating the regime but without permanently 
removing the previous regime.  There was little for the Coalition to do to solve 
this problem.  Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the other leaders of Iraq ran from 
the Coalition, choosing to hide.  During this period, Saddam Hussein focused on 
survival; seeking to evade capture by Coalition forces.  As Saddam Hussein hid, 
others within the former regime seized this chaotic period as an opportunity to 
mobilize.  In short, while the United States focused on eliminating the last 
vestiges of Hussein’s regime during the early months of occupation, emerging 
Sunni leaders seized upon this lack of effective governance to organize and 
mobilize their constituencies.  Thus, the imperfect end to the conflict created an 
opportunity for Sunni-based anti-Coalition groups to become effective agitators in 
the weeks following cessation of major hostilities.  
Moreover, while the opposition was mobilizing in the underground, the 
United States’ immediate focus following the conflict was on reducing troop 
strength and finding anticipated weapons of mass destruction.  As violence 
against the Coalition increased, senior leaders placed the blame on dead-enders 
and foreign terrorists.   
Further, the opposition created additional opportunity through the use of 
violence.  As violence against Coalition forces increased, areas within the 
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country became Coaltion “no-go zones.”158  These no-go zones included 
Samara, Ramadi, and most famously, Fallujah.  As Coalition forces drew back 
from these areas, the contest for the support of the population dramatically 
shifted to the opposition.  According to Bruce Hoffman, “It is a truism of 
counterinsurgency that a population will give its allegiance to the side that will 
best protect it.”159  These uncontested spaces enabled the opposition to 
dominate both the physical and information space, in effect avoiding the 
underground.  Traditionally, an insurgency is a contest for the population.  During 
extended periods in 2004, the opposition was able to win the contest unopposed.  
The vacuum created in these areas gave the opposition freedom of movement 
and safe haven, enabling mobilization above ground.   
 
2. Opposition Mobilizing Structures 
Primary mobilization structures for the opposition in Sunni-based areas 
included previous regime actions, Coalition policies, and an unchallenged 
information space.   
In a perverse sense, the discriminatory and manipulative policies of the 
Hussein regime provided ready social networks alienated from the emerging 
power structure in Iraq.  Throughout his reign Saddam Hussein retained an iron 
grip on Iraq through the skillful manipulation of the diversity and makeup of the 
Iraqi population.  This manipulation resulted in creating layers of trust within the 
government through nepotism, tribal ties, and careful vetting of loyalty.160  
Saddam Hussein selected those closest to him by relying on family, tribal, and 
Ba’ath Party affiliations.  This close knit group largely made up the “deck of 
cards” wanted by the Coalition.  After the fall of Baghdad, this group dispersed 
and was hunted by the Coalition.  The former regime leadership was forced into 
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the underworld, likely relying on the same trusted network of family and tribal 
connections for support.  This designed hierarchy of “haves” in Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq, became outsiders which forced this former hierarchy to band 
together or lose all of its previous influence. 
As Saddam Hussein went into hiding, the Coalition formulated its 
approach for post-conflict governance.  It is insufficient at this point to label the 
Coalition Provisional Authority policies of de-Ba’athification and disbanding of the 
Iraqi Army as the cause of the insurgency.161  Although these policies likely 
contributed recruits as foot soldiers, it is a certainty that the current suspected 
leaders of the Sunni groups would have been unwelcome in any future Iraqi 
society.  Whereas former Ba’athist leaders would be unwelcome, a role for the 
remnants of the Iraqi Army is less clear.  Disbanding of the Iraqi Army likely 
impacted the growth of the insurgency in two potential ways:  1. Increased the 
number of unemployed in a country with no industry; and 2. Limited the potential 
reuse of Army soldiers in other capacities supporting the Coalition.  Despite the 
fact that large segments of the Iraqi Army did dissolve in the face of the Coalition 
invasion, some Coalition units, such as the 101st Airborne Division, were 
moderately successful in recruiting former soldiers in the area around Mosul.162  
This practice ended with the CPA order #2, which officially disbanded the former 
Iraqi Army. 
While the connection between these policies and the growth of the 
insurgency cannot be empirically linked, the lack of opportunity for unemployed 
Iraqis has created a market for anti-Coalition activities.  The 4th Infantry Division 
Commander, MG Raymond Odierno, reported that payment for attacks on 
Coalition was increasing, “When we first got here (Oct 2003), we believed it was 
about $100 to conduct an attack against coalition forces, and $500 if you’re 
successful.  We now (Mar 2004) believe it’s somewhere between $1000 and 
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$2000 if you conduct an attack, and $3000 to $5000 if you’re successful.”163  
This developing market has enabled the opposition groups to mobilize actions 
against the Coalition leveraging funds rather than recruits.  It is important to note, 
however, that the rising costs potentially indicate that security measures and the 
establishment of the interim Iraqi government are resulting in an improved 
security posture within Iraq.    
Another mobilization opportunity for the opposition emerged in 
unchallenged information spaces.  As discussed previously, the Coalition 
inadvertently provided political opportunity to the Sunni-based insurgent groups 
in areas that became no-go zones for the Coalition.  In the aftermath of the U.S.-
led re-capturing of Fallujah, the totality of insurgent control of the city and 
associated information space became apparent.  This enabled the creation of an 
insurgent infrastructure within the city.  The figure below is an extract from an 
after-action report on the insurgent presence at the time of the U.S operation to 
reclaim Fallujah. 
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Figure 24.   Opposition controlled positions in Fallujah prior to U.S. action, Nov 
2004164 
Though lacking direct evidence to determine which facilities were used to 
mobilize in terms of recruitment, it is clear that mosques (60 of 100 in Fallujah)165 
were used as a point for conducting violent actions against the U.S.-led Coalition, 
the interim Iraqi government, and the Iraqi population.  The level of control as 
shown in Figure 24 and the resulting impact of such a density of movement sites 
are described in research by Charles Tilly.  In his research on the importance of 
space and place in mobilizing collective action, he states: 
High proximity fixed connections generate substantial local 
knowledge as well as extensive interplay between contentious 
repertoires and routine noncontentious social interaction.166 
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In this case, Fallujah is the extreme example of groups’ total domination of 
the physical and information space.  There has been no battle of ideas between 
the group and the government.  Thus, in certain areas of Iraq, the Sunni-based 
opposition groups have become the de facto government.   
In contrast to the case of Fallujah, other areas in the country, such as 
Mosul, were secured by Coalition forces since the fall of the Hussein regime.  
Areas, such as Mosul, have had much lower rates of violent attacks and as of 
early April 2005 Iraqi security forces prepared to assume primacy in providing 
security in the city.167  Reasons attributed to this drastically improved situation in 
Mosul, include:   
The military attributes the decline to several factors, including Iraqis' 
increased willingness to provide information about insurgents and 
the growing presence of the new Iraqi security forces throughout 
the country. But the main reason, military officials said, is a grinding 
counterinsurgency operation  --  now in its 20th month…It is a 
campaign of endless repetition: platoons of American troops 
patrolling Iraqi streets on foot or in armored vehicles. Its inherent 
monotony is punctuated by moments of extreme violence.168 
In contrast to the “no-go zone” of Fallujah, Mosul was space contested by 
the Coalition since April 2003.  The tireless efforts of the units stationed there has 
resulted in increased trust, effectively countering opposition actions in that city. 
 
4. Frames and Repertoires of Action  
Sunni-based opposition groups also leveraged framing processes and 
violent repertoires of action.  Given the disparate nature of the groups involved in 
the Sunni-based insurgency, their frames and framing processes are not uniform 
and no clear cut ideology exists.  What do exist are common frames, consisting 
of anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi government, and anti-collaboration messages and 
actions.   
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The master frame of the opposition forces has been anti-Coalition.  All 
other frames and actions amplify the anti-Coalition frame, where blame is laid on 
the Coalition for the change in status of the Sunni areas.  Iraq is replete with 
examples of anti-Coaliton framing, such as this statement from the Islamic Army 
of Iraq: 
When the infidel Americans and their allies became weak and the 
burden [of Iraq] became unbearable, they decided to rescue their 
remaining dignity by using so-called democracy in order to rule over 
us using our own people.  It is well-known that the meaning of 
democracy is ‘rule of the people’, but their decisions are not true to 
this infidel concept.  Moreover, they impose whatever they like in 
the name of democracy, this democracy that gives cover to 
occupation and tyranny.169   
Likewise other groups echo the anti-Coalition refrain.  Ansar al-Sunnah 
provides another example of the anti-coalition framing that has occurred within 
the Sunni opposition forces.  Having announced its formation in September 2003 
as a mixture of foreign jihadists, former members of Ansar al-Islam (the Northern 
Iraq, Kurdish based group that harbored Zarqawi), and Iraqi Sunnis, the group 
announced that it was “A detachment of mujahadeen, ulema, and political and 
military experts, who are seasoned in Islamic conflict against atheists.”170  Ansar 
al-Sunnah produces a bridging of anti-Coalition messages with justification for 
these actions through a duty of jihad.  Regardless of the group, each has used 
violence to reinforce their words. 
Anti-coalition framing has been supported with indiscriminate violence 
against Coalition forces within Iraq.  The sheer number of anti-Coalition attacks 
has been staggering.  Since April 2004, there have been more than 1500 attacks 
on Coalition forces per month.  Although these attacks were not exclusively 
Sunni-based, these groups are credited with over 90% of the attacks.171  Sunni-
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based groups have also used specific, targeted attacks against Coalition 
members to attempt to fracture the Coalition.  Attacks on Coalition intelligence 
services and kidnappings serve as examples of this class of attack.  
Attacks on Coalition intelligence services illustrate the sophistication and 
tactical abilities of the opposition.  In separate attacks, Ansar al-Sunnah claimed 
responsibility for the ambush and killing of Coalition intelligence forces.  The first 
in January 2004 killed eight Canadian and British “intelligence men.”172  Ansar 
al-Sunnah produced a videotape of the attack.  While the Coalition has not 
acknowledged this attack, or the identities of the victims, the potential systematic 
targeting of the Coalition intelligence apparatus represents a next step in 
opposition tactics. In a separate attack in November 2004, seven Spanish 
intelligence officers were killed in an ambush near Baghdad.173  
Using a tactic made famous by the Zarqawi kidnapping and execution of 
Nicholas Berg174, Sunni-based groups have also used kidnappings as a 
repertoire of violent action.  These kidnappings have targeted foreign contractors, 
media, non-governmental organizations, as well as Iraqi and Kurdish leaders.  
Foreign countries targeted have included:  South Korea, Nepal, Italy, France, 
Russia, China, Lebanon, Italy, Phillipines, Pakistan, Egypt, Bulgaria, Britain, and 
of course, the United States.  In some of the cases those kidnapped have been 
executed; in others, the country has negotiated a release.  Groups that have 
claimed responsibility for kidnappings include:  Ansar al-Sunnah, Islamic Anger 
Brigades, and the Assadullah Brigades.175  These groups have not limited their 
attacks to the Coalition. 
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The Sunni-based groups extended their venom to include the Iraqi 
government, principally the nascent Iraqi security forces.  As Iraqi Security forces 
have grown, the Iraqi opposition has systematically targeted these emerging 
forces.  The most gruesome of these attacks occurred in late October 2004, 
when 49 new Iraqi Army recruits were murdered after departing an Iraqi training 
base on leave.  The attack and its impact were immediately felt within the 
Coalition and the Iraqi government.  Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi responded by 
saying, “I think there was major negligence by the multinational forces.  It was a 
way to damage Iraq and the Iraqi people.”176  While this attack was among the 
most gruesome, it was not an isolated incident.  Iraqi security forces have also 
been kidnapped and reports of infiltration of the Iraqi Army by the insurgents 
have also been widely reported.177   
Perhaps the most successful tactic to implement anti-coalition and anti-
government frames has been suicide bombings.  These groups have leveraged 
suicide bombings as a critical repertoire of action against the Coalition and the 
Iraqi population.  Suicide bombings have produced extremely devastating 
attacks.  This terror tactic has become more prevalent in Iraq, peaking at 133 in 
November 2004.178  Major General John DeFreitas III, Multi-National Forces-Iraq 
Director of Intelligence, underscores the impact of these attacks, “We see the 
suicide car bomb as the insurgents’ precision guided weapon.  No other weapon 
is so efficient at terrorizing and intimidating the population.”179  Iraqi security force 
recruits have been particularly vulnerable to this class of attack.  A suicide 
attacker, posing as another recruit, walks into a crowd in front of a recruiting 
station and detonates his explosives; killing or maiming the gathered crowd.180   
                                            
176 Edward Wong, 2004. “Allawi Blames ‘Negligence by U.S.-led Force for Ambush Deaths 
of 49 Iraqi Soldiers,” New York Times, 27 October 2004, 10.  
177 Ibid. 
178 Rod Nordland, Christopher Dickey. 2005. “Unmasking the Insurgents.” Newsweek 145, 
no. 6 (7 February): 20. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Steve Fainaru. 2005. “Blast at Iraqi Recruiting Center Kills 21 as Insurgency Mounts; 168 
People Have Died in Post-Election Violence, Officials Say.” The Washington Post, A.20. 
92 
Whereas targeting of Iraqi security forces has been significant, the 
opposition’s attacks on the Iraqi economy may have the longest term effect.  
Sunni-based groups have been very successful in the targeting of the Iraqi 
economy, besieging the oil industry with acts of sabotage.  The U.S. Director of 
Reconstruction for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, David Taylor, said in 
November 2004, “The minister of oil is very concerned about…the security of 
people repairing oil lines and intimidating truck drivers.”181  The results of these 
attacks speak for themselves.  A recent report by the Brookings Institute shows 
that Iraqi oil revenues have declined to $1.34B in February 2005 from a high of 
$1.99B in October 2004.182  In addition to these direct attacks on the Iraqi 
security forces and the Iraqi economy, the other primary opposition frame 
extends to Iraqi citizens considering employment or support to the Iraqi 
government. 
The anti-collaboration frame has directly targeted the Iraqi populace, 
branding supporters of the government or employees of the government as 
“collaborators.”  Anyone working with the Coalition is potentially targeted.  One 
example is Iraqi translators working for the Coalition, by late October 2004, some 
45 assisting the U.S. military had been killed in Baghdad alone.183   
Sunni-based groups have created a very effective anti-collaboration 
frame.  Supported closely with repertoires of violence, this frame has resonated 
within the Iraqi population.  Immediately following the U.S.-led liberation of 
Fallujah, Lt Gen Lance Smith, Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command 
said, “I will tell you that the intimidation campaign that is ongoing is very effective 
and we see it permeates many levels of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi 
security forces.184”  The opposition has translated these negative frames into 
                                            
181 Esther Schrader and Mark Mazzetti. “The Conflict in Iraq; Chaos in Iraq Imperils Voting; 
Security in Some Areas Has Deteriorated, U.S. officials say, stalling efforts to rebuild and 
threatening the elections planned for January.” Los Angeles Times, 20 November 2004. 
182 O'Hanlon.  
183 Rod Nordland, 2004. “No Place is Safe.” Newsweek 144, no. 14 (October): 30.  
184 Schrader and Mazzetti. 
93 
violent actions or repertoires against the Coalition, the interim Iraqi government, 
and the Iraqi population. 
To reinforce this anti-collaboration frame, the opposition also successfully 
used psychological operations as part of their operations, distributing leaflets in 
areas of the country that may come under attack.  Examples of this occurred 
post-Fallujah (Nov. 2004) when insurgents stepped up attacks in Baghdad.  Prior 
to the operations, leaflets were distributed in Baghdad neighborhoods urging 
government workers to stay home to “avoid putting their lives in danger.”185   
In another anti-collaboration repertoire, Newsweek has reported that in 
neighborhoods across Baghdad (Feb 2005), “renunciation centers”186 were 
established.  At these locations, Iraqis accused of cooperating with the Coalition 
can avoid death by publicly announcing their opposition to the Coalition.  In some 
cases these renunciations are done in person, in other cases the renunciation 
must be accomplished in writing. 
 
5. Conclusions 
What has emerged in Iraq is an unlikely, unholy alliance of disparate 
groups and individuals that have coalesced into an anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi 
government movement.  According to Bruce Hoffman, the current state of 
opposition in Iraq is as follows: 
The Iraqi insurgency has no center of gravity.  Secular Ba’athists 
and other (Former Regime Elements) are cooperating with 
domestic and foreign religious extremists…The Iraqi insurgency 
today appears to have no clear leader (or leadership), no ambition 
to seize and actually hold territory, no unifying ideology, and most 
importantly, no identifiable organization.187  
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This movement continued to mobilize support throughout 2004.  While the 
success of the Iraqi elections within Shi’a areas provided optimism, potential 
exists that the lack of Sunni participation will increase the oppositional 
consciousness within Sunni areas.  The challenge for the emerging Iraqi 
government will be to somehow expand the inclusiveness of the new government 
to include the disenfranchised populous within these areas, while also mitigating 
the influence of foreign elements and former Ba’athist leaders. 
Throughout the post-conflict period, the Iraqi population’s views of the 
Coalition have also deteriorated.  Table 7 shows the results of polls conducted by 




How much confidence do you have in the Coalition to improve the situation in Iraq? 
 January 2004 May 2004 
Great Deal 11.6% 1.5% 
Fair Amount 16.7% 8.2% 
Not Very Much 13.7% 6.1% 
None at all 53.3% 80.6% 
Table 7.   Iraqi population’s view of the Coalition188 
 
Similarly, an International Republican Institute poll completed in October 
2004 asked Iraqis, “Thinking about the difficult situation in Iraq currently, whether 
in terms of security, the economy, or living conditions, who in your view is most to 
blame?”189  A full third (33.4%) blamed the multinational forces, 32% foreign 
terrorists, 8% the armed supporters of the former regime, and 12%, a 
combination of the three.   
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Though certainly not conclusive, the opposition’s attempts to blame the 
Coalition appear to be resonating with the population.  Although these numbers 
are not encouraging, the situation is not completely dire.  Understanding and 
defusing the opposition’s mobilization structures and countering the oppositional 
frames can weaken this amorphous anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi opposition.   
Additionally, polling conducted on behalf of the Department of State during 
the December 2004 to March 2005 timeframe identified the population’s 
confidence in the violent opposition.  The Figure below summarizes the findings. 













Figure 25.   Iraqi Confidence in the Opposition 
According to these polls, the opposition has been able to sustain some 
confidence in a segment of the population, but the month of the Iraqi elections 
showed a significant deterioration of support.   
 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
The Iraqi elections created enormous opportunities for the new Iraqi 
government to weaken support for the Sunni-based opposition.  While the low 
voter turnout within Sunni areas is a large concern, the recent steps taken by the 
new government to include Sunni leaders is a positive step for legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Sunni population.  Also, the initial announcements made by new Iraqi 
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leaders signal intent to weaken the mobilization structures and frames of the 
opposition.   
To date, the frames used by the Sunni-based opposition have been anti-
Coalition and anti-collaboration, the opposition has not offered a positive agenda 
or a vision for Iraq.  In contrast, the new Iraqi government has established a 
desire for inclusion and reinforcement of an Iraqi nationalism frame.  This 
counterframing190 potentially allows the new government to weaken the 
opposition by offering Iraqi nationalism and a vision for a new Iraq as an effective 
positive counter to the negative agenda of the opposition. 
In his first remarks about the opposition, Iraq’s new President, Jalal 
Tabani, discussed the potential of a broad amnesty program.  Tabani 
distinguished foreign elements (such as Zarqawi) and Iraqi opposition, “It is 
essential that we separate those who came from outside the country, like all 
those organizations affiliated with al Qaeda, from Iraqis.  We must seek to win 
over the Iraqis to the democratic process going on in the country.”191  The 
attempts at inclusion will be challenging, but if teamed successfully with an 
increased effort to promote Iraqi nationalism; the opposition may be forced 
deeper into the underground. 
To promote nationalism and attack the oppositions use of terror tactics, 
one outlet chosen by the Iraqi government is a novel one:  reality TV.  The new 
show “Terrorism in the Hands of Justice” has created a large following on the 
Iraqi state-owned television network.  During each show, captured opposition 
confess to attacks on the Iraqi people.  The show is controversial due to the 
potential for coerced confessions, yet the effort by the Iraqi government to label 
the opposition as mercenaries and anti-Iraqi does draw a response.  One 
Baghdad resident responded to the show, “For the first time, we saw those who 
claim to be jihadists as simple $50 murders who would do everything in the name 
                                            
190 Robert Benford, and David A. Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: 
An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26, 611. 
191 Ellen Knickmeyer. “Talabani Offers Amnesty to Insurgents; New Iraqi President Reaches 
Out to Sunnis, Names Jafari as Prime Minister.” The Washington Post, 8 April 2005. 
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of Islam.  Our religion is too lofty, noble, and humane to have such thugs and 
killers.”192  This is certainly not the entire answer,, but these anecdotes show 
intent by the emerging Iraqi government to counter the opposition’s message and 
mobilization structures.   
The new Iraqi government’s efforts to create a renewed sense of Iraqi 
nationalism will be difficult, but there are signs that opportunity exists for the new 
government.  In the same polls that showed a declining trust in Coalition forces, 
the Iraqi people have demonstrated exceedingly high confidence in their new 
Iraqi Army and police forces.  In both cases, 74% of Iraqis surveyed stated that 
they had either a great deal or quite a lot of trust for these new Iraqi security 
organizations.193  If the government can successfully include increasing numbers 
of the Sunni minority, this will potentially drive the opposition further into the 
underground.  These actions combined with previous Coalition and Iraqi security 
force actions to limit safe havens for the opposition limits the opposition’s space 
to mobilize.  The deeper into the underground the opposition descends, the new 
government can contest both the physical and information space throughout the 

















                                             
192 Caryle Murphy and Khalid Saffar. “Actors in the Insurgency Are Reluctant TV Stars; 
Terror Suspects Grilled, Mocked on Hit Iraqi Show.” The Washington Post, 5 April 2005.  
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The decision to effect regime change in Iraq was a historic turning point in 
U.S. military action.  This first attempt to implement the Bush Doctrine of 
preemption will have lasting impacts on grand strategy for the nation and military 
tactics for the U.S. military.  Identifying the right lessons from this conflict is 
essential.  The United States-led Coalition in Iraq has sacrificed troops and 
treasure to displace Saddam Hussein with the intent to install a peaceful, 
democratic government.  Having won the military operations phase so 
convincingly, challenges in the post-conflict phase have unexpectedly placed 
enormous strain on the military and left victory in doubt.  This paper argues that 
the Coalition faced unanticipated challenges and violence in Iraq for three related 
reasons:  First, an inability to provide security for the Iraqi population; second, the 
rapid collapse in Iraqi confidence in the Coalition; and finally, the availability of 
uncontested physical and information space for opposition mobilization.  These 
three key developments occurred due to a mismatch between Coalition policies 
and tactics implemented in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam 
Hussein. 
 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ 
I use two analytical approaches to examine post-conflict Iraq.  The first is 
an examination of Coalition policies and tactics using criteria for fostering revolt 
from a first-hand authority on Arab rebellion, T.E. Lawrence.  Using Lawrence’s 
framework, I conclude: 
• Pre-conflict, U.S. military leaders planned on leveraging Iraqi 
military personnel in post-conflict Iraq, but the combined impact of 
the lack of resources to pay the Iraqi military and the Coalition 
decision to disband the Iraqi military left Coalition forces unable to 
satisfy Lawrence’s “doctrine of acreage.”   
• Coalition military commanders responded to increasing violence 
with aggressive offensive military operations, further limiting 
security for the Iraqi population.  
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• A bifurcated chain of command for security created seams in 
Coalition security policy and tactics; these seams grew into 
unsecured areas of the country creating opportunities for opposition 
mobilization. 
• Continued post-conflict emphasis on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, mandated a significant percentage of intelligence 
resources focus solely on WMD; this placed tactical commanders at 
a significant information disadvantage to the opposition until tactical 
intelligence capabilities were constituted  
 
The second analytical framework uses social movement theory to analyze 
the growth of the opposition in Iraq.  Social movement theory examines how 
individuals and groups mobilize and sustain collective action against an existing 
power.  In the case of Iraq, I examine the Sadr II Movement and the Sunni-based 
opposition and draw the following conclusions: 
• As a result of initial Coalition policies and tactics, no-go zones 
emerged within portions of Iraq; this uncontested physical and 
information space fueled the growth of the opposition within Iraq. 
• The Sadr II Movement’s emergence in Iraq was part of an 
organizational struggle within the Shi’a community; one that 
continues today. 
• Despite being weakened by his failed attempt to control key sites in 
Najaf in August 2004, Muqtada al-Sadr is the only named Iraqi 
opposition to the U.S.-led Coalition; given future political 
opportunity the Sadr II Movement remains a threat to a future Iraqi 
government. 
• The only unifying messages for the Sunni-based opposition are 
anti-Coalition and anti-collaboration.  The Sunni opposition have 
not presented a vision for a future, unoccupied Iraq.   
• The different motivations and message from the Sunni and Shi’a 
opposition act as a self-limiter in the overall effectiveness of the 
opposition. 
• Iraqi government efforts to establish a nationalistic frame are a 
positive counter-framing step to capitalize on potential support 
within the Iraqi population. 
 
Is there a possible strategy for success in Iraq?  Success or failure in Iraq 
will ultimately be determined by the Iraqi government.  Regardless of the number 
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of Coalition Force offensive operations, the insurgency in Iraq will not be 
defeated based solely on military operations.  The Iraqi government must create 
a unifying strategy centered on Iraqi nationalism.  A prerequisite for implementing 
any strategy in Iraq will be the successful completion and approval of an Iraqi-
drafted Constitution, followed by nationwide elections of a new Iraqi government.  
This breakthrough will provide an opportunity for the Iraqi government to 
distinguish itself from the Coalition and implement policies that could potentially 
weaken the insurgency.  Having examined the views of the population and the 
growth of the insurgency, the author concludes: 
• The Iraqi government should emphasize a master-frame of Iraqi 
nationalism, supported by a frame to remove all foreign presence 
from Iraq.  The Iraqi government can request popular support to rid 
the nation of any violent, foreign opposition, while the government 
negotiates a drawn down of Coalition Forces.  
• Following the election, the Iraqi government should assert itself as 
the first Iraqi government elected under an Iraqi-drafted 
Constitution and request immediate removal of some Coalition 
Forces with a graduated plan for removal of remaining foreign 
troops within 12-24 months. 
o This policy supports Iraqi and Coalition interests.  Ultimately, 
the Iraqi government must separate itself from the Coalition 
to be respected by the population.  The U.S.-led Coalition 
looks forward to a reduced presence in Iraq.  This policy 
negates both the anti-Coalition and anti-collaboration frames 
from the violent opposition. 
•  The Iraqi government should independently negotiate an amnesty 
program with the Sunni-based opposition that is consistent with 
Iraqi culture and Islamic law.   
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• The government should build on the population’s confidence in the 
emerging Iraqi Security and Police Forces, by emphasizing 
population security over offensive operations.   
This strategy is reliant on popular support.  Early removal of Coalition 
Forces places a greater onus on the still maturing Iraqi Security and Police 
Forces, but the presence of Coalition Forces is both a strength in the form 
of offensive operations and a negative in terms of opposition framing.   
 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OCCUPATIONS 
Post-conflict Iraq provides a case study for regime change operations.  
Some of the lessons may be distasteful to learn, but understanding what went 
right and what went wrong is crucial for future post-conflict operations.  Iraq is not 
an exact template for future, post-conflict operations, but some macro lessons 
can be highlighted.   The Iraq experience suggests the following: 
• The issue is not troop strength, it is control.  It is overly simplistic to 
say that more troops were needed to satisfy the doctrine of acreage 
in Iraq.  Future post-conflict operations should emphasize local 
control, using a combination of indigenous tribal, military, and police 
forces with U.S. and Coalition troops. 
• Unity of command in post-conflict operations is a prerequisite.  
Unity of effort in all Coalition efforts is needed to successfully 
synchronize security, reconstruction, and governance tasks.  
• Intelligence resources should not be dedicated to a single 
intelligence requirement, but rather tasked and controlled by local 
commanders and intelligence professionals.  
• The first security priority in post-conflict should be popular security.  
They do not have to like us, but the population must be confident in 
our ability to protect them. 
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• Post-conflict funding must be front-loaded and readily available for 
tactical commanders.  As MG Patreus emphasized in post-conflict 
Iraq, “money is our ammunition.”  Not in large contracts, but in cash 
available to local commanders to meet initial needs.  While some of 
these funds will likely incur some fraud and graft, this initial 
investment will return rewards ten fold in terms of addressing 
popular concerns.   
Understanding the Iraqi conflict is a mandate for the nation.  Our marines, 
soldiers, airmen and sailors have shown amazing bravery and dedication in 
carrying out the Iraqi mission.  Future post-conflict planning must learn from the 
enormous shortfalls of the immediate post-conflict period in Iraq and match 
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